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Introduction
The most fundamental issue facing policymakers in
India is the question of the balance between govern-
ment and free markets. Throughout the postwar era,
India has adopted a highly interventionist approach.
But since 1991, the country has been deregulating
and liberalizing the domestic economy and opening it
to the world. However, India has remained cautious
in its approach to liberalization, an approach vindi-
cated in the light of comparisons with the East Asian
experience. Yet, reformers in India appear deter-
mined to accelerate liberalization despite recent
events in East Asia. It is appropriate to use these
events as an opportunity to review the merits and
demerits of India’s latest reform program.
Evidence from other Asian countries, as well as
from India itself, supports the maintenance of a cer-
tain degree of Government intervention that is wel-
fare-enhancing. In particular, governments continue
to play an important role in designing and implement-
ing the institutional framework within which agents
can operate. Moreover, due to informational imper-
fections, the credit market is a key platform for ap-
propriate and beneficial government intervention.
Therefore, governments should consider the pros and
cons of giving up control over monetary policy to
independent central banks.
Macroeconomic Policy
Management Prior and
During the 1991 Crisis,
and Implications
The Crisis of 1990/91
In 1991, India faced a full-blown balance of pay-
ments crisis. While this was triggered partly by ex-
ternal events, the root causes were mainly to be found
in domestic policies. In 1989/90, the often volatile
agricultural sector recovered abruptly. Furthermore,
domestic credit creation continued to expand, thus
fueling domestic demand. Significant Government
spending added to this (fiscal demand boosted the
fiscal deficit to more than 10 percent of gross do-
mestic product [GDP] in 1990/91). Since much of
the fiscal spending was funded by credit creation by
the commercial banks or the Reserve Bank of India
(RBI), it further added to money supply expansion.
This strong domestic expansion boosted imports.
Hence the current account deficit expanded to 3
percent of GDP. Similar to the late 1980s, this was
initially largely funded by either remittances of over-
seas Indians or government and private sector bor-
rowing from abroad.1 After the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait in August 1990, however, oil prices rose
sharply. This led to an abrupt widening of the Indian
trade deficit. At the same time, Indian residents
abroad, many of them in the affected Gulf region,
sharply reduced their remittances home. Meanwhile,
strong domestic demand boosted nominal economic
growth above the potential growth rate. This not only
fueled imports, but also pushed up the inflation rate
to 12 percent and higher in early 1991.2
Bulging fiscal and current account deficits and the
threat of rampant inflation did not make the rupee at-
tractive to foreign investors. India’s creditworthiness
was downgraded by international rating agencies. As
private foreign lending and overseas remittances dried
up, the official foreign exchange and gold reserves
had to be relied upon to plug the gaping hole in the
balance of payments. Eventually, official reserves
reached alarmingly low levels of only $1 billion—just
two weeks worth of imports. Having actually run out
of liquid dollar assets, RBI was even forced to ship
gold bullion to the Bank of England. India was on the
verge of outright default on its foreign liabilities. To
avoid this, the Government asked for assistance from
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Causes of the Crisis
A mounting body of evidence indicates that the in-
creasingly open trade regime introduced by the
Gandhi administration from the mid-1980s has had
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an adverse impact on the Indian economy. Most of
the high growth during the 1980s was based on do-
mestic demand and was generated by the consumer
goods sector. Only 11 percent of the 52 percent out-
put rise was due to exports. Output of capital goods
fell by 7 percent and that of intermediate goods also
dropped slightly. Marjit and Nirvikar (1993) found
that “there was no strong evidence that exports were
a spur to improved performance, including techno-
logical change.” Nambiar and Tadas (1994) observed
that “for the period 1978/79 to 1989/90, trade shrank
value added in manufacturing roughly by 6 percent
points.” At the same time, the booming import-inten-
sive consumer durable sector worsened the current
account balance. Since the growing openness to the
world market resulted in gains of the resource- and
labor-intensive sectors at the cost of the technology-
and capital-intensive industries, Nambiar and Tadas
(1994) conclude: “Trade is certainly the root cause of
inverting the structure of Indian industry. If this is the
kind of industrial restructuring that is being attempted,
then the country is heading for long-run trouble. It will
kick people from relatively high-paid to low-paid jobs.”
Other researchers have come to similar conclusions.3
Finally, the increasingly liberal trade regime left
the Government with fewer policy tools to rein in
the current account deficit. Until the 1980s, bal-
ance of payments crises were met mainly by the
imposition of tariff and nontariff barriers to imports.
However, the policy of deregulation and tariff re-
duction that began in the mid-1980s blocked this
traditional avenue.
Policy Response and Implications
for India’s Approach Toward
Further Liberalization in the 1990s
The policy response was to deploy severe quantita-
tive restrictions on imports. IMF-imposed policies,
as always, focused on restricting domestic demand
by reducing credit expansion (which was achieved
by raising the cash reserve requirement [CRR], in-
creasing margin requirements for loans,4 and raising
interest rates), and draconian fiscal tightening. Con-
sequently, real GDP growth slowed to 0.9 percent,
the lowest since 1979/80. Industrial production growth
slowed equally sharply to only 1 percent. Based on
this contraction of domestic demand growth, the bal-
ance of payments improved sharply. Meanwhile, a
standby credit from IMF was used to support a 19
percent devaluation of the rupee. Funding was con-
ditional on a far-reaching reform package, having
found overexpansionary fiscal policy to be the main
culprit in the creation of the crisis.5  The IMF pack-
age included reforms in trade and capital account,
banking sector, and industrial policy.
However, the occurrence of the crisis and the role
of hasty precrisis reforms under Gandhi strengthened
the case of the gradualists who had been arguing in
favor of only moderately progressing liberalization, as
opposed to the “shock therapy” approach espoused
by international organizations. Those favoring a gradu-
alist approach to reform argued in 1991 that the politi-
cal and social acceptability of the reform package is
an essential condition for its sustainability.6
Overview of Macroeconomic
Management and the
Liberalization Process
Macroeconomic Management
in the 1990s
The new Government that took office in June 1991
was committed to a far-reaching program of struc-
tural reforms. Yet, the immediate task faced was the
need to stabilize the economy. Following the time-
worn IMF recipe, it adopted measures to reduce the
fiscal deficit and inflation, and improve the balance
of payments. A drastic squeeze on domestic credit
creation by the banking system and the central bank
was used to restrict domestic demand. At the same
time, fiscal tightening reduced the Government’s
claims on given resources. As domestic demand
shrank sharply, for any given propensity to import,
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the trade balance had to improve. The drastic import
controls that had been introduced when the balance
of payments crisis first emerged were also contin-
ued. This was combined with a 19 percent devalua-
tion of the rupee, which had been supported by a
standby credit from IMF.
As a result, GDP growth slowed to 0.8 percent
in 1991/92 and agricultural and manufacturing out-
put fell by 2.3 percent and 1.7 percent, respec-
tively.7  The balance of payments improved sharply,
from a deficit of 3.5 percent of GDP in 1990/91 to
only 0.7 percent in 1991/92. Foreign exchange re-
serves shot up to $6 billion. Inflation, on the other
hand, increased further to about 14 percent on av-
erage in 1991/92.8
From 1992/93, an initially patchy recovery of do-
mestic demand turned into a broad-based full-blown
economic recovery. Although industrial production
remained weak in 1992/93 and 1993/94, it acceler-
ated in 1994/95 and 1995/96 (averaging 10.5 per-
cent). India had not only recovered within a year
from a severe balance of payments crisis, but had
also quickly come out of the recession that resulted
from measures taken to address the balance of pay-
ments crisis. The goal of external stability was clearly
achieved, and not only in the initial postcrisis months.
The current account deficit remained below 1 per-
cent of GDP in all but one year from 1991/92 to
1994/95.
However, because India’s recession had been brief,
the risks associated with the policy to stabilize the
external value of the currency at the cost of domes-
tic demand were not as visible as those in most East
Asian countries affected by the 1997/98 crisis. There-
fore, it is not clear that other countries that suffer
from a balance of payments crisis should necessar-
ily follow India’s example. One reason why the re-
cession in India was shorter than anticipated was
the rapid accumulation of foreign reserves, partly due
to capital inflows that started to rise from 1992. These
capital inflows were partly attracted by the increased
opportunities for foreign investors in postreform In-
dia due to the policy shift from a closed economy to
a more globalized economic system.
The sequencing of balance of payments crises is
important. If the crisis comes at a time when foreign
capital has not been invested to any significant de-
gree in the country, then a reform program may help
attract foreign investors, who will then contribute to
an accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and
an improvement in the balance of payments. How-
ever, it is a one-off trump card that the East Asian
countries had mostly played by 1994, at a time when
there was no economic crisis. On the contrary, their
excessive opening to foreign capital, which attracted
short-term funds that were eventually withdrawn at
short notice, was an important cause of their crises.
India, however, was not tempted by its positive
experience with foreign investors, to open the doors
to them too quickly. As we will see below, the cau-
tious Indian stance toward borrowing from abroad,
especially for the short term, has been the main rea-
son why India has avoided being drawn into the Asian
crisis directly.
Overview of Timing and
Sequencing of the Liberalization
Process Since 1991
In late 1991 and early 1992, a far-reaching reform
program was introduced in India. The fundamental
aim had been to liberalize markets and switch the
economic system to one characterized by market
orientation. Key policy changes in terms of domestic
macroeconomic management had been focused on
the containment of the fiscal deficit, the subsidence
of inflationary pressures, and the restoration of mon-
etary policy toward regulating money and credit in
the pursuit of its central objectives of price and ex-
change rate stability. These changes coincided with
the movement toward global integration of financial
services. Since reforms of industrial and trade poli-
cies had already begun in the 1980s, the banking sec-
tor experienced the biggest change as a result of the
1991/92 reforms.
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FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORM POLICIES
In India, financial sector reform is virtually identical
to banking sector reform. More than 80 percent of
the funds flowing through the financial sector are
accounted for by the banking system. In 1969, all
large banks were nationalized. Today, most banks
are still in public hands, but the share of private banks
has risen from 11 to 17 percent.9 In the prereform
era, authorities heavily regulated virtually all bank
activities. This included completely regulated inter-
est rates and full licensing on branching, as well as
most commercial operations. Indeed, quantitative
targets virtually prescribed their commercial strate-
gies, such as the plans for the expansion of bank
branch networks in rural areas, as well as detailed
credit controls.
As economic reforms were introduced in the
1980s, RBI and other reform-minded interests be-
gan to circulate the idea that the Indian financial sector
needed to be reformed drastically. In particular, the
argument was made that prudential regulations, as
well as consumer, depositor, and investor protection,
had been neglected. Moreover, poor profitability of
public sector commercial banks and their dependence
on regular equity infusions from the Government was
criticized. As a result, the Chakarvarty Committee
was set up to examine the issues facing the financial
sector. Its 1985 report advocated independent mon-
etary management and targeting, restructuring of the
interest rate structure, reducing the reliance of the
banking system on the Government, granting a
greater degree of autonomy to banks in their lending
operations, and raising interest rates on Government
securities toward market-determined rates. The re-
port of the Working Group on the Money Market in
1987 led to reforms to create an active market for
short-term financial assets by introducing bill financ-
ing. Since the late 1980s, RBI has introduced steps
to liberalize and simplify the interest rate structure.10
Moreover, the introduction of certificates of deposit
in June 1989 and commercial paper (CP) in January
1990 increased the use of market-determined inter-
est rates. However, the implementation of the rec-
ommended reforms was considered too slow by the
proreform camp. The balance of payments crisis and
intervention by IMF suddenly strengthened their le-
verage. This resulted in the financial reforms.
In the early 1990s banking reform proceeded in
two phases. The first phase was launched in 1992
and closely followed the recommendations of the
Committee on Financial System (CFS) in November
1991. It focused on the modification of the political
environment and the degree of direct Government
intervention in the banking system. The second phase
was launched in October 1997 by RBI Governor C.
Rangarajan.11 It was aimed at improving the finan-
cial soundness and credibility of banks, creating a
competitive environment, and strengthening the in-
stitutional framework.
During the first part, RBI and the reformers lob-
bied for greater freedom for banks to determine key
variables of their industry, such as the setting of in-
terest rates, the size and role of reserve requirements,
and the size and role of the compulsory lending re-
quirement to the Government (via the statutory li-
quidity requirements). The measures that were imple-
mented in line with the CFS report included the fol-
lowing:
• in February 1992, accounting practices for bank
financial statements were brought more in line
with international standards in order to enhance
transparency and credibility.
• in April 1992, asset classification criteria were
improved and income recognition has been ren-
dered more stringent;12
• the complex and detailed administered interest
rate structure was deregulated. The most im-
portant interest rates are now market deter-
mined. These include all deposit rates, except
for fixed savings deposits (which account for
15–20 percent of bank deposits).13 Banks are
now free to determine their lending rate for loans
above Rs2 lakh. Below this amount, a maximum
ceiling prevails, so that small borrowers are
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treated like the large ones.14 Moreover, interest
rate subsidies have been significantly reduced;
• the licensing of branching was partially abol-
ished;15
• prudential norms have been introduced, espe-
cially with respect to provisioning for various cat-
egories of market-related and substandard as-
sets. Specifically, the definition for nonperforming
loans (NPLs) was tightened;16
• between April 1992 and March 1996, RBI phased
in the 8 percent capital/risk-weighted assets ad-
equacy requirement based on the Basle Commit-
tee norm.17  The combined impact of increased
write-offs and provisions to reflect the weakened
financial position due to more stringent prudential
and accounting standards was estimated to re-
quire $4 billion equivalent of new capital;
• in mid-1992, RBI introduced new Government
securities through auction sale (364-day Trea-
sury bills, and five-year and ten-year bonds);18
• in July 1992, the establishment of the Board for
Financial Supervision (BFS), which is part of
RBI, was announced. BFS would enhance the
supervision of banks and nonbanking financial
institutions (NBFIs) and development finance in-
stitutions;
• in August 1992, the Government allowed public
sector banks to access the capital market in or-
der to raise the additional capital needed to fulfill
the new capital adequacy and prudential require-
ments; and
• the mandatory credit allocation to priority sec-
tors was scaled down by reducing interest rate
subsidies, thereby boosting banks’ profitability.
The statutory liquidity requirement (SLR) and
CRR have been progressively reduced.19
In September 1992, a working group on financial
companies recommended a strengthening of regula-
tion and supervision of NBFIs20 by the newly consti-
tuted BFS. The regulatory framework for NBFIs,
effective January 1998, involves making credit rat-
ings compulsory,21 introducing prudential guidelines
(along the lines of commercial banks),22 capital ad-
equacy set at 10 percent,23 an interest ceiling fixed
at 16 percent,24 and a minimum liquid deposit require-
ment of 12 percent of total deposits.25
The second phase of banking sector reform be-
gan in April 1998 with the report of the Committee
on Banking Sector Reforms,26 which recommended
further deregulation and liberalization of the banking
system, together with the further tightening of pru-
dential requirements. The committee also argued for
further strengthening of the independence of RBI by
amending the various laws prescribing its legal sta-
tus (Appendix 1).
Concerning credit controls, the 1998 Narasimham
report asserted that recent developments in Asia had
“served to reinforce the point that a strong  and effi-
cient financial system is necessary both to strengthen
the domestic economy and make it more efficient
and also to enable it to meet the challenges posed by
financial globalization. Nothing is more indicative of
the quality of the banking sector’s assets than the
quantum and incidence of nonperform-ing assets
(NPAs). The causes for a high proportion of NPAs
are varied. Often, as international experience has
shown, a high incidence of NPAs could be traced to
policies of directed credit. When banks are required
by directive to meet specific quantitative targets,
there is, as our own experience has shown, the dan-
ger of erosion of the quality of the loan portfolio.”
ASSESSMENT OF BANKING REFORMS
Reform efforts have been justified to overcome short-
comings and distortions in the banking sector and
improve efficiency in mobilizing and allocating re-
sources, thus providing the basis for accelerating
economic growth and development. Reforms were
thought to enhance the access of the private sector
to financial savings, and reduce interest rate and
credit allocation distortions. Reform advocates have
foreseen branch and bank mergers as well as sub-
stantial staff retrenchment with potentially severe
social impact as a result of these reforms. They ar-
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gued that the reforms would ensure that only invest-
ments with the highest returns are funded.
No doubt, India’s approach to the implementation
of reforms, namely to move in slow, careful steps
and avoid “shock therapy,” must be highly com-
mended.27  However, given recent experiences in
Asia and other countries, there is also a great need
to review the fundamental premises of the banking
reform program.
The case for the success of the reforms is implicitly
made in the 1998 Narasimham report, which con-
tends that interest rate deregulation for loans above
Rs2 lakh has increased competition among banks to
attract a greater number of big corporate clients.
Consequently, interest payments for big projects have
been reduced, making more projects profitable and,
therefore, encouraging these big companies to bor-
row from banks. At the same time small borrowers
have so far remained protected, because of the ceil-
ing imposed on interest rates of smaller loans.
However, this case in favor of interest rate de-
regulation is tenuous and based on partial equilibrium
analysis.28 On a macro level, it is clear that if interest
rates had actually been too high to ensure a welfare-
optimal level of investment, as the above argument
implies, then instead of a costly banking sector re-
form, RBI could have simply lowered interest rates.
On the contrary, there is indeed evidence that
banking sector reform carries high costs and high
risks. Over the past two decades, accumulated evi-
dence from many advanced countries suggests that
deregulation of banking systems usually leads to major
resource misallocation. These can be divided into costs
that are due to the cyclical and the structural im-
pacts of the reforms.
Cyclical Impact of Reforms
A significant short-term cost of the early reforms
is the reduction in private sector credit creation, which
has been triggered since the mid-1990s by increas-
ing tightening of prudential regulations. Given the
much more difficult prudential and capital adequacy
ratios and the requirement to mark more of their in-
vestments to market (since 1992), there has been
strong evidence that banks have become more risk-
averse. Since the reforms raised interest rates of
Government securities, as the reformers had de-
manded, they are now more attractive. Overall,
banks’ assets have, therefore, been reallocated to-
ward increased investments in securities and less
bank credit to the private sector. This has happened
at a time when the reforms also reduced the com-
pulsory bank purchases of Government bonds as pre-
scribed by the SLR. As a result, loan extension to
the corporate sector is not as strong as would be
desirable.
Structural Impact of Reforms:
Assessment of Credit Control Policies
The imposition of credit controls is the key reform
issue, because such controls have acted as the uni-
fied tool of fiscal, monetary, and structural policies.29
The main question concerning banking sector reform
is, therefore, whether the credit market should be
left to its own devices, without any Government in-
tervention beyond prudential regulations, or Govern-
ment intervention in the credit market can be
welfare-enhancing and, therefore, India should con-
tinue its system of credit controls even in a modified
system.
The results of decades of controls and direction
of bank activity were described as being “surpris-
ingly positive” even by critics of Government inter-
vention in financial markets.30  For instance, because
of direct targets on the establishment of bank branch-
es, especially in rural areas, the number of actual
bank branches has expanded at a dramatic pace.
This has helped increase savings, and thus reduce
inflationary pressures. Also, it has enabled the Gov-
ernment to allocate new purchasing power to the
corporate sector, without the threat of accelerating
inflation.
The credit controls have been criticized for years,
especially by international organizations. The
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argument is that they constitute undue Government
involvement in markets, which, it is said, must entail
inefficiencies and lead to resource misallocation.
While the latter is certainly a danger and a possibil-
ity, it does not necessarily follow. In imperfect mar-
kets or when externalities are present, economic
theory tells us that Government intervention can be
welfare enhancing.31 Moral hazard may apply not
only to borrowers, but also to lenders, if there is ex-
plicit or implicit free deposit insurance or govern-
ment assurance of bailout (as is common in modern
economies). Its dangers, however, are exacerbated
during liberalization, as banks are given increased
freedom with regard to interest rates and the direc-
tion of credit. Even supporters of liberalization con-
cede that in such circumstances, ceilings on deposit
and loan interest rates may well be desirable.32 Thus,
the issue on the efficiency of credit controls in India
remains to be settled.
India’s credit controls certainly helped avoid the
vast resource misallocation seen in many countries
that have deregulated their banks. The share of lend-
ing, and hence credit creation, used for speculation
has remained low by international standards. In In-
dia, less than 10 percent of loans have been extended
to the real estate sector or for use in capital
markets.33 This has prevented the emergence of a
significant asset bubble.
Another argument in favor of regulated credit
markets is that regulated interest rates have kept the
cost of funding the fiscal deficit and national debt
under control. Interest rate deregulation and a shift
of Government funding from the banking system and
central bank to the open market raise interest costs
and potentially the overall interest rate level. As Joshi
and Little (1996) argue, this may not only be detri-
mental to economic growth, but “high interest rates
consequent upon interest deregulation can lead to
financial crises...this provides a valid ground for some
interest rate regulation.” They therefore recommend
that “it would be wise to put deposit rate deregula-
tion on hold until (i) further progress is made with
fiscal adjustment, and (ii) deposit rates are fully de-
regulated to keep in reserve the power to impose a
ceiling on the lending rate and to use it in good time if
it becomes necessary.” It seems, therefore, that a
full-scale review of the merits and dangers of de-
regulation of interest rates is necessary before too
many costs and the danger of a major financial crisis
are imposed on a country that has other problems to
struggle with (such as poverty, income and wealth
disparities, social welfare and education, infrastruct-
ural bottlenecks, etc.) and is in no need for new,
policy-induced disasters.
Although credit controls have been criticized as
discriminating against private sector borrowers, it is
hard to see how a liberalized banking system would
solve the problem of discrimination. In a perfectly
competitive banking system that has been fully de-
regulated, imperfect information implies that banks
ration credit even in equilibrium. Pervasive credit
rationing results in discrimination against small firms.
This suggests that the banking sector reforms at best
merely substitute one form of discrimination by an-
other. However, since the Government for the past
half century has been highly successful in supporting
economic growth and development while minimizing
social costs, it is hard to see why this mandate should
now be taken away.
In a developing economy where market efficiency
is even less likely to be attained than in advanced
countries and where most other economic policy tools
suffer from implementation problems, credit controls
represent a simple and efficient tool that can serve
many purposes. For instance, credit controls have
enabled the Government to monetize fiscal spend-
ing, as banks were effectively forced to purchase
Government bonds. This meant that both fiscal and
monetary policies could be implemented simulta-
neously and in a coordinated fashion. Moreover, the
statutory Government bond purchases acted as a de
facto prudential instrument. By controlling the allo-
cation of credit among various sectors of the econo-
my, structural and social policy objectives could be
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met. Thus, directed credit has acted as the unified
policy tool to implement structural, sectoral, and so-
cial policies, as well as prudential policy, in addition
to the standard fiscal and monetary cyclical policies.
There is no clear indication that taking away this
tool from the democratically elected government and
instead empowering unelected banks or a central
bank as the key decision makers, which are prone to
pursue sectarian rather than public interests, will en-
hance social welfare. Unlike mere financial inter-
mediaries, the banking sector performs a public good
function by creating and allocating the vast majority
of purchasing power. Therefore, Government inter-
vention, or even ownership of this sector, may be
welfare enhancing.
However, the recent reforms and latest reform
proposals have not only drastically reduced the
power of intervention of the Government. Through
tightening of capital adequacy rules, they have cre-
ated a back-door policy avenue toward de facto
privatization of the banking system. As banks are
forced to raise capital, and as the Government is
prevented by recent reforms from providing equity
capital, private sector fund raising will occur, dilut-
ing Government ownership. Privatization, an impor-
tant policy decision, should not be implemented in
such a way. Rather, parties in favor of privatization
should take their proposals to the appropriate demo-
cratic institutions.
Directed credit has been successful in its instru-
mental role of bringing about fast economic growth
in Japan; Korea; Malaysia; and Taipei,China among
others. Criticism of this argument focuses on the
fact that the explicit, official programs of directed
credit, via Government development banks, were
very small in those East Asian countries and hence
could not sufficiently explain their stunning devel-
opment success.34 However, this shows a funda-
mental misunderstanding of the programs of directed
credit in those countries. The official lending by Gov-
ernment development banks accounted indeed for
a diminishing fraction of total directed lending. The
key mechanism of directing credit flows is far less
known and thus has hardly been covered by the
literature. It is the imposition of credit growth tar-
gets over the commercial banking system and the
direction of all lending by commercial banks among
the various industrial sectors that were conducted
by the central banks in those countries. In Japan,
for instance, from 1942 to 1991, the Bank of Japan
used its window guidance credit controls not only
to control the quantity of credit allocation but more
crucially, to regulate its allocation among industrial
sectors. Loans to sectors that were less important
for fast economic growth were quantitatively re-
stricted (such as ”consumptive” loans to the con-
sumer and individual household sector, but also, un-
til the 1970s, real estate loans). On the contrary,
banks were virtually ordered to expand loans to the
sectors that were deemed highly productive, i.e.,
the key growth industries designated by the Minis-
try of International Trade and Industry (MITI).
There can be no doubt that this program has been
the single most important reason for the meteoric
rise of the postwar Japanese economy.35
Given these considerations, and the stark empiri-
cal evidence of the impact of deregulating the bank-
ing sector in Asia and Europe, including recent events
in the Asian region, the Indian Government must be
commended for resisting for so long the political pres-
sures from interested parties, such as RBI, to abol-
ish credit controls and the strong reservations it pos-
ited against hasty acceleration of a financial sector
reform program.
Financial Sector Supervision and
Central Bank Independence
The reforms have de facto transferred supervi-
sory power over the financial sector, as well as
decision-making power over monetary policy and the
economically effective part of fiscal policy from the
Government to RBI. The decoupling of fiscal and
monetary policies has strengthened the hand of RBI.
In addition, the creation of BFS, which is de facto
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part of RBI, has greatly reduced the influence of the
Government over the banking system. This is not
necessarily a positive development. While there is
literature that proposes a causal link between cen-
tral bank independence and low inflation, recent work
shows that no such link exists. Moreover, there is
strong evidence that independent central banks that
lack significant checks, balances, and mechanisms
for accountability may act detrimentally to national
welfare.36
The most recent example has been the policy of
the Bank of Thailand in the second half of the 1990s.
The Bank of Thailand acted fully independently—
while the Government and its Ministry of Finance
were unable to intervene—when it created what must
be considered the biggest peacetime misallocation
of resources in Thai history.37 Concentrating too much
power over any sector of the economy in the hands
of one institution is likely to create vested interests
and incentives to place priority on sectarian inter-
ests, rather than the maximization of overall national
welfare. The selection of personnel of RBI should
be farmed out to an independent outside institution
and RBI should be made directly accountable for its
policies. Moreover, supervision over the financial
sector should not be conducted by an institution con-
nected to RBI.
REFORM OF MONETARY POLICY
Monetary policy is an integral part, and indeed the
core of macroeconomic management policy of the
Government. Originally, RBI, founded in 1934, acted
as the executive branch of the Ministry of Finance in
implementing monetary policy. Since 1969, RBI has
announced its credit policy every six months, deter-
mined jointly with the Ministry of Finance.38  How-
ever, over the past two decades, RBI has striven to
gain control over monetary policy and reduced the
influence of the Government over its activity. Yet,
government policy tools, such as the SLR, severely
limited RBI’s room to maneuver. In an attempt to
emphasize its own stance, since 1985, RBI has set
an official money supply (M3) target as an interme-
diary policy target, which it announces at the begin-
ning of the fiscal year in April (with a mid-term re-
view in October). A target for commercial bank
credit growth was set consistent with this. The money
and credit growth targets were determined by add-
ing an expected inflation rate to the desired real GDP
growth rate39 and by scaling the coefficient derived
from an empirical money demand function.40
In the past the RBI has used quantitative tools in
implementing monetary policy, such as the CRR and
the setting of the bank rate. However, since 1992,
open market operations in the gilt-edged market, as
well as Government bills have been used. Since then,
the repo rate has increasingly been emphasized as
intermediary target.41  The operations of RBI now
also include such money market instruments as pri-
vate CPs and certificates of deposit (CDs) as well
as overnight call money intervention.
Monetary Statistics and Intermediary Target
The tradition of compilation and dissemination of
RBI monetary statistics dates back to 1935. How-
ever, the rationale and analytical foundation of the
compilation of monetary aggregates were only re-
ported to the public in the report of the First Working
Group on Money Supply (FWG) of 1961 and the re-
port of the Second Working Group (SWG) of 1977.
The SWG recommended the presentation of mon-
etary statistics based on balance sheet data of the
central bank, the banking sectors and the postal au-
thorities. However, the Governor of RBI set up the
Third Working Group (TWG) on 3 December 1997,
whose recommendations were submitted on 23 June
1998.42 The TWG argued that due to increasing fi-
nancial liberalization, since the late 1980s, and the
resulting gradual blurring of distinctions between dif-
ferent types of financial institutions, the existing mon-
etary aggregates had to be changed. Moreover, it
suggested that the new IMF Manual on Monetary
and Financial Statistics, available so far in draft
form, needed to be reflected in the Indian statistics.
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This is based on the ongoing move by RBI to em-
phasize indirect instruments of monetary control, i.e.,
to shift from credit controls to interest rates as mon-
etary policy tool.
The TWG defines money “for policy purposes”
“as the set of liquid financial assets, the variation in
the stock of which could impact on aggregate eco-
nomic activity.”43 In the report, a distinction is be-
ing made between the “money issuing sector,”
namely the banking sector, and the “money holding
sector,” defined as the aggregate of households, non-
financial commercial sector and nondepository fi-
nancial corporations.44 Similar to central banks in
other countries, the RBI has defined the money
supply by various subsets of private sector savings,
such as M1 or M3, with the official rationale that
they are characterized by a good correlation with
GDP.45  The TWG concluded by recommending the
compilation of four measures of monetary aggre-
gates and three measures of liquidity aggregates,
all of which are varying, arbitrary subsets of pri-
vate sector savings.46
Werner (1993 and 1997) shows that for purposes
of economic analysis and monetary policy, it is nec-
essary to focus on banking sector assets, as these
constitute the net creation of new purchasing power,
which can theoretically be expected to be in a more
stable relationship with nominal GDP. The TWG ac-
knowledges the importance and relevance of this
argument, as it admits that: “Bank credit is often spe-
cifically referred to in several writings in monetary
economics, as a critical variable affecting consump-
tion and capital formation in a direct manner. As such
it is often regarded as a more useful indicator of real
sector activity than money supply.” Moreover, in In-
dia, one of the objectives of monetary policy is “en-
suring adequate flow of credit to the productive sec-
tors of the economy.” Given also the growing open-
ness of the economy, the TWG recognized the need
for having comprehensive measures of credit.”47 It
proposed to broaden the definition of bank credit to
the commercial sector by including bank investment
in CP, shares and debt instruments issued by the sec-
tor  in the conventional credit aggregates. It also rec-
ommended the preparation of a comprehensive fi-
nancial sector survey on a quarterly basis.48
While the TWG recognizes the existence of such
approaches, it failed to recommend the aggregates
that are to be published, and the policy tools and
intermediary targets to be used. The recommended
monetary aggregates do not go beyond the ones
listed above, without mention of the credit approach.
The policy target used by RBI was “broad money,”
namely M3, which appears to be endorsed by the
TWG. A major reason for this sudden unilateral
focus on traditional M-indicators appears to be the
citation of empirical evidence in favor of this ap-
proach. According to the report, the “real broad
money balances and aggregate income were found
to be cointegrated, reflecting a long-run equilibrium
relationship between real broad money (M3) and
real GDP.” However, statistical deficiencies, espe-
cially concerning the stability properties of the rela-
tionship, were found.49 As a result of these, the
group admits that “monetary policy exclusively
based on the demand function for money could lack
precision.” Yet, despite these crucial shortcomings,
and in spite of the theoretical superiority of the credit
approach, the TWG failed to advance the increased
use of credit aggregates.50
Independent research concerning the crucial re-
lationship between the monetary sector and the real
economy is, therefore, required. A first modest at-
tempt is presented in Appendix 2.51  It has been men-
tioned at various places in the paper that credit policy
seemed to be important in India in order to achieve
price stability. The common monetary approach to
explain inflation is based on money aggregates such
as M2 or M3 (quantitative theory of money), and
India follows that approach, even though the TWG
recommends the introduction of liquidity measures.52
To show the relationship between credit and infla-
tion, both credit and M3 have been plotted against
the consumer price index (CPI) (Figures 1 and 2).
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The Credit Approach
Werner (1997) has indicated that money should
be seen as credit. Traditional measures of the money
supply, such as M3, consist mainly of deposit money
that is no longer available to the economy. Werner,
therefore, sees M3 as “potential purchasing power.”
Credit, on the other hand, can be seen as effective
purchasing power. The driving forces for real eco-
nomic activity are, therefore, found on the asset side
of the balance sheets of the banks.53 Applied to the
Indian economy, not M3 but credit should therefore
be expected to be the driving force for the CPI.
Statistical Evidence During
the Different Crises
In this study, RBI’s “credit to commercial sector,”
(primary credit creation) was used as a proxy for
overall credit creation in the economy. As can be
gleaned from the figures presented, the credit ag-
gregate has greater explanatory power than the
money supply aggregate. Special attention should be
drawn to the different crises India went through dur-
ing the observation period (see Appendix 2).
Based on the credit interpretation presented in
Appendix 2, the conclusion by the TWG has no em-
pirical support. Instead of broader monetary aggre-
gates, which the TWG referred to as “liquidity ag-
gregates,” detailed credit aggregates should be in-
troduced. Furthermore, monetary targeting should
focus on credit. Even though only “RBI credit to
commercial sector” has been used for the analyses,
it beats the money supply, measured as M3, in ex-
plaining inflation in India. An even better result might
be possible if bank credit to the commercial sector
could be included. Detailed credit figures broken
down by industrial sector could also serve as proxies
for price changes in different sectors. The TWG rec-
ognizes that detailed credit figures will be necessary
for more thorough analyses. Comprehensive and
timely credit statistics, also disaggregated by indus-
trial sector, need to be collected and published.
It must be mentioned, however, that the credit
approach may not be as unpopular at RBI as the
central bank claims in its official statements. De-
spite the official liberalization of credit controls, there
is still ample room for RBI to use “moral suasion”
to control credit quantities, as well as the allocation
of funds. As eyewitness testimonies have confirmed,
RBI monitors the total balance sheet of banks fort-
nightly. RBI then compares credit growth with data
on industrial production, capital investment, and
prices in order to determine whether the economy
is likely to expand faster than targeted.
Monetary Policy Decision Making
and Status of RBI
On 31 March 1997, amended legislation was
passed that vested more powers with RBI, in par-
ticular, the expanded competence to oversee
Figure 1: CPI and Credit (percent change)
CPI = consumer price index.
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
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Figure 2: CPI and M3 (percent change)
CPI = consumer price index.
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
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NBFIs.54 Further, it was agreed that by the year 2000,
RBI would be completely independent. In a phased
program, the central bank has gradually received
greater autonomy in its management of the economy.
Before April 1994, the money supply was to an im-
portant extent driven by Government recourse to
central bank borrowing (automatic monetization; ad
hoc bill issuance). This meant that a close link ex-
isted between fiscal and monetary policies. How-
ever, in the 1990s, there was a policy decision to
delink monetary and fiscal policies. Since April 1994,
this has been phased out over a period of three years
and then, from April 1997, stopped altogether. This
was the centerpiece of the structural policy to shift
India’s economy from one with administered, cen-
tralized planning and directed investment to one where
decisions are taken on the basis of prices in liberal-
ized markets. Instead, the “ways and means re-
sources” procedure has been implemented, which
requires the Government to borrow at the interbank
rate.55 Moreover, all Government borrowing is now
conducted through the auction process.56
Policy Coordination
In conclusion, monetary policy is now in theory
and practice fully in the hands of RBI, which also
unites the function of lender of last resort and regu-
lator of the financial sector. Since RBI is not di-
rectly an agency representing the elected Govern-
ment, the possibility exists that monetary policy will
not be coordinated with fiscal and other policies.
Uncoordinated monetary and fiscal policies, imple-
mented by two separate entities (the Ministry of
Finance and RBI) could lead to a major macroeco-
nomic misallocation of resources. There are many
examples in other countries of disastrous combina-
tions of tight monetary and loose fiscal policy (which
could lead to spiralling fiscal deficits) or loose mon-
etary and tight fiscal policy (which can lead to credit-
driven real estate boom/bust cycles). The lack of
coordination of fiscal and monetary policies has been
a major cause of the boom/bust cycle in Japan in
the 1980s and 1990s, as well as the currency and
financial crises in Thailand in the 1990s, among other
countries.57 Governments should therefore be aware
of the pros and cons of decoupling fiscal policy from
monetary policy.
FISCAL POLICY AND PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM
Public savings
In sharp contrast to India’s private savings per-
formance—comparable to those of Malaysia and
other East Asian economies—India’s public savings
performance (the excess of central and state gov-
ernment revenues over current expenditure plus the
gross profits of public enterprises) has been much
worse and deteriorating. Since the 1980s it has been
constantly in decline from about 3 percent to virtu-
ally zero at present. Improving public savings per-
formance is needed, particularly to raise public in-
vestment shares in infrastructure and social services
that would help to achieve and sustain satisfactory
rates of growth and poverty reduction. Due to per-
sistent fiscal deficits, total government debt has in-
creased from 45.5 percent of GDP (Rs59,749 crore)
in 1980/81  to 65.2 percent (Rs314,558 crore) in 1990/
91. While rising in absolute terms to an estimated
Rs773,541 crore in 1997/98, it has fallen somewhat
as a share of GDP to 61.4 percent. However, these
figures are defined as total internal and external li-
abilities, including liabilities to RBI. Excluding RBI
liabilities, the debt-GDP ratios were 35.7 percent in
1980/81, 51.4 percent in 1990/91, and a high 53 per-
cent in 1997/98. Due to the increased independence
of RBI and, thus, drastically reduced ability of the
Government to borrow from the central bank, the
latter ratios are likely to rise rapidly over the coming
years to converge with the ratios inclusive of RBI
liabilities. Given these large levels of central Gov-
ernment debt, interest payments have reached high
levels. Of the total fiscal deficit of an estimated
Rs86,345 crore in 1997/98, Rs65,700 crore or 76
percent are interest payments, while the primary
deficit accounts for only Rs20,645 crore.
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State Finances
The Government allocates to the states about 30
percent of the tax receipts it mobilizes and 40 per-
cent of the tax receipts it retains. It also provides
loans and grants to the states equivalent to about 25
percent of its total expenditure. In order to solve their
financial problems, as a rule, the states have been
heavily relying on the central Government for funds,
which have been provided over the years mainly
through three main channels: (i) transfer through the
Finance Commission (appointed every five years by
the President of India), which has declined from 65
percent during 1969–1974 to 58 percent of the total
central Government transfers to the states in 1992/
93; (ii) allocations authorized by the Planning Com-
mission for Economic and Social Development—in
this manner about  50 percent of state deficits has
been financed in recent years; and (iii) the central
Government, which has direct or indirect control over
the way in which the remainder of these deficits is
financed.
Fiscal Deficits
While India recorded modest fiscal deficits up
to the late 1970s, the situation deteriorated sharply
in the 1980s, as government expenditures on in-
terest payments, defense, and subsidies increased
rapidly. Consequently, the fiscal deficit of the Gov-
ernment expanded from 6.2 percent of GDP in
1980/81 to 8.3 percent in 1990/91. Fiscal reform
policies have, nevertheless, reduced the fiscal defi-
cit to 5.9 percent of GDP in 1991/92, 5.4 percent
in 1995/96, and 5.2 percent in 1996/97. However,
according to revised estimates, the 1997/98 bud-
get deteriorated significantly again to 6.1 percent
of GDP. A major reason for the sudden deteriora-
tion has been the slowdown in tax revenues, ad-
versely affected by slower economic growth in
industrial output and imports. The latter is largely
the result of banking reform (which has raised the
risk aversion of banks) and the monetary policy of
RBI.
The two key policy developments concerning fis-
cal reform have been: (i) a systematic reform of the
tax structure in line with the Tax Reform Commit-
tee; and (ii) a Memorandum of Understanding be-
tween the Government and RBI to phase out the
automatic monetization of the fiscal deficit over a
three-year period.
Reform Measures in Subsequent Budgets
The central Government budget for 1996/97 aimed
at a moderate reduction of the fiscal deficit to 5 per-
cent of GDP. The budget included measures to ex-
pand the tax base and reduce tax rates. A minimum
tax on corporate profits was introduced, the cover-
age of the tax on services was expanded, and the
MODVAT (moderate value-added tax) system of
excise duty credits was extended to the textile sec-
tor. The Government also reduced custom duties on
capital goods and intermediate inputs and cut in half
the surcharge on corporate income. On the spending
side, the budget included a contingency provision to
meet the costs of the Pay Commission recommen-
dations on pay scales, as well as higher allocations
for spending on the social sectors, infrastructure, and
support of state plans, in line with the Government’s
“Common Minimum Program.” A reduction in de-
fense spending was targeted, which could keep the
total expenditure constant as a share of GDP.
However, supplementary allocations for defense
spending were added. Expenditures were 0.3 per-
cent of GDP less than budgeted, despite supplemen-
tary allocations for defense spending (0.2 percent of
GDP). The savings came from unused provision for
the Pay Commission’s awards (postponed until 1997/
98) and lower plan outlays (0.2 percent of GDP)
related to failure of the Government to fully utilize
funds on rural developments, public works, and mid-
day school meals. Mainly due to good bank liquidity
during the fiscal period, the Government program for
market borrowing was successful.
The central Government budget for 1997/98 aimed
to reduce the fiscal deficit from 5 percent of GDP to
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4.5 percent—the lowest level for two decades—
while cutting substantially income tax rates and cus-
toms duties. Key changes included the reduction of
the top marginal personal income tax rate from 40 to
30 percent, decrease in corporate tax rate for do-
mestic companies from 40 to 35 percent, abolition of
surcharges on corporate tax, lowering of the tax rate
on royalty and technical service fees to foreign com-
panies from 30 to 20 percent, exemption of export
profits from the minimum alternate tax, and abolition
of tax on dividends.
On import duties, the Government decided to
achieve the average level of tariffs prevalent in As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries by 2000. To this end, the peak level of cus-
toms duties was lowered from 50 to 40 percent, while
customs duties were brought down further on a large
number of selected inputs, and raw materials and
intermediate inputs in the power, chemicals, textiles
and information technology sectors. The duty on capi-
tal goods was further lowered from 25 to 20 per-
cent. For excise duties, the concession scheme for
small-scale units was radically simplified, and the
ambit of service taxes widened to cover road trans-
portation service, consulting engineers, steamer/ship-
ping agents, air travel agents, etc.
The targeted deficit reduction is largely to be
achieved through an increase in divestment receipts
(budgeted at Rs48 billion or 0.3 percent of GDP), while
tax revenues and expenditures are projected to be
broadly unchanged relative to GDP. However, mod-
est steps have been taken to widen the tax base. Cur-
rently, only a small proportion of the population actu-
ally pays taxes. Attempts were made to raise this pro-
portion by stipulating that residents of large metropoli-
tan cities who satisfy certain specified economic cri-
teria must file a tax return. Moreover, an estimated
income scheme was introduced for retail traders. Fi-
nally, a new Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme
was introduced, which proved highly successful.
On 1 June 1998, India’s finance minister,
Yashwant Sinha, announced the budget for 1998/
99. Even though there are differing views on the
impact of the budget on improving the state of de-
velopment, the common underlying assessment is
that India fell back into a higher degree of interven-
tionist policy. As the Economist58  stated, “many of
the party members (of the Bhanatiya Janata Party
[BJP]) … believe Indian companies should be built
up before the economy is opened up to foreign
competition.” One step in that direction is the flat
8 percent import-duty surcharge and increased
duties on several items, such as copper, aimed at
protecting Indian industry. At the same time the
Government woos mainly overseas Indians by of-
fering new concessions and schemes to invest in
India. This can also be seen as one step toward
higher self-reliance.
Government Subsidies in India
In order to reduce the budget deficits and total
Government debt, methods to raise revenues (such
as increases in the tax base and fee-based provision
of services) as well as methods to lower expendi-
tures must be considered. An important proposal that
could simultaneously decrease expenditures and raise
revenues is the reduction of subsidies on the provi-
sion of services. Currently, subsidies (unrecovered
costs) in the provision of economic and social ser-
vices by the Government are pervasive. According
to a study by the National Institute of Public Finance
and Policy (NIPFP), the aggregate level of subsidy
in 1994/95 for all services provided by the central
and state governments amounted to Rs137,338 crore
and constituted 14.4 percent of GDP. The NIPFP
distinguished between “merit” and “nonmerit”
subsidies. It found out that subsidies by the central
Government on “merit goods” accounted for
Rs6,923 crore, or less than 1 percent of GDP. Since
the average all-India recovery for the nonmerit sub-
sidies is just 10.3 percent, the subsidy rate amounted
to almost 90 percent. The policy proposal to reduce
the scale of subsidies is to phase increases in user
charges.
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CAPITAL ACCOUNT AND EXCHANGE RATE
POLICIES
Capital Account Policies
The Indian Government has been cautious toward
liberalizing the capital account. As part of the struc-
tural reform package, inflows and outflows by non-
residents have been partly deregulated. Foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) was allowed into India after
1991.59 Portfolio investment into India was allowed
only under the restriction that it be implemented by
foreign institutional investors (FIIs), consisting mainly
of broad-based funds such as investment funds and
pension funds. In August 1994, when India accepted
Article 8 of the Articles of Agreement of IMF, it
made its current account fully convertible.
In the aftermath of the Mexican crisis of De-
cember 1994, capital inflows slowed significantly.
Together with a widening current account deficit
and an appreciating dollar, this contributed to a 9
percent depreciation of the rupee between August
and Oct-ober 1995. In order to recoup reserve
losses and attract foreign inflows, RBI adopted an-
other set of deregulation measures: (i) foreign cur-
rency nonresident (FCNR) and nonresident
(nonrepatriable) rupee deposits were exempted
from the CRR, (ii) inward remittances of global
depository receipt (GDR) proceeds and external
borrowing norms were relaxed, (iii) interest rates
on nonresident external deposits were raised, (iv)
the scheme of postshipment export credit denomi-
nated in dollars (PSCFC) was terminated, (iv) an
interest rate surcharge was imposed on import fi-
nance, (v) interest rates on postshipment export
rupee credit for more than 90 days and up to 180
days were freed, and (v) the cancellation of for-
ward contracts was put under RBI monitoring. On
the other hand, foreign investors are free to repa-
triate profits without limit and nonresidents enjoy
complete currency convertibility.60 In 1998, inflows
and outflows of gold were also deregulated.
Despite these steps toward liberalization, many
important restrictions remain. First, capital outflows
by residents are still forbidden or highly controlled.61
Second, portfolio investment by foreigners is allowed,
but only through FIIs whose investments are restricted
to listed securities, excluding Government debt (but
recently including financing bills).62 Third, offshore
borrowing by Indian entities is under strict control of
the Ministry of Finance. Fourth, controls exist both
on the end-use of the loans (i.e., only for productive
purposes) and on the maturity of the loan (a mini-
mum maturity is set, ensuring long-term investment).
Fifth, an overall cap is set on external borrowing.
Banks are not allowed to maintain external foreign
liabilities without approval. Short-term borrowing is
completely forbidden. There is an aggregate ceiling
for medium-term debt with maturity of five to
ten years (maximum aggregate is $8 billion, with
permission). Each bank cannot draw more than
$15 million offshore. Borrowing for exports and in-
frastructure can be of maturities as short as three
years. Borrowing above 10 years’ maturity is com-
pletely free.63 Given all these restrictions, short-term
foreign currency liabilities of banks account for less
than 10 percent of total liabilities and not more than
15 percent of tier-1 capital.64  Excluding trade-re-
lated borrowing, total short-term foreign denominated
borrowing amounts to only 25 percent of total RBI
foreign exchange reserves and 7 percent of total ex-
ternal debt. Strict rules exist on holding foreign ex-
change, whether on- or offshore.65
The measures have been successful, as the rupee
remained remarkably stable during 1996/97 and until
the outbreak of the Asian crisis.66  As the capital
account surplus more than doubled (to about
$11.6 billion during 1996/97, exceeding the previous
peak of $9.7 billion of 1993/94), RBI was forced to
intervene in order to prevent an appreciation of the
rupee.67  The resulting buildup of foreign exchange
reserves threatened to boost domestic credit creation,
which in turn prompted the RBI to reintroduce repo
operations (discontinued in the second half of 1996/
97) in November 1996 and accelerate the implemen-
tation of the Government borrowing requirement for
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1997/98. Currently, short-term debt amounts to only
$6 billion.68
Since 1991, India’s capital accounts have remained
manageable. Yet in the turbulent environment cre-
ated by the Asian economic crisis, several challenges
may lie ahead.
• Foreign investments in India’s oil industry have
been insufficient so far in spite of the efforts of
the Government to attract them. By early 1999,
India was expected to import crude oil.
• India is scheduled to repay $24 billion of its ex-
ternal debt (estimated at $96 billion of which
$4 billion is short-term debt) before the year
2000. This is in addition to the rollover of both
the short-term debt and the nonresident Indian
(NRI) accounts. Even without the rollover, with
the present financial requirements of the cur-
rent account deficit, India needed to mobilize
about $33 billion of external finance for the
1997–2000 period.
• NRI foreign currency accounts continue to be a
potential source of pressure since in theory they
can be withdrawn on demand, subject to a small
penalty, and thus create vulnerability.
• Although India enjoys a strong liquidity position—
$31.6 billion of reserves versus short-term liabili-
ties—recent developments in emerging capital
markets have highlighted the macroeconomic tur-
bulence that sudden changes in market senti-
ments can bring about.
• The unprecedented sequence of good monsoons
might end, bringing bad ones.
Latest Reforms
In order to facilitate investment financing, particu-
larly in infrastructure, the Government has taken fur-
ther steps to reduce restrictions on capital account
transactions in 1996/97. With a view to moving to-
ward capital account convertibility, the Union Bud-
get for 1997/98 proposed the introduction of a legis-
lative bill entitled “Foreign Exchange Management
Act” to replace the “Foreign Exchange Regulation
Act” passed in 1973. Furthermore, a Committee on
Capital Account Convertibility was appointed by RBI
on 28 February 1997. The Committee submitted five
recommendations in its report on 30 May 1997.69
First, capital account convertibility should be imple-
mented over three years. Second, certain precondi-
tions or signposts and attendant variables should be
monitored including those that were identified from
lessons of international experience. In particular, the
Committee recommended the monitoring of fiscal
consolidation and inflation. The Committee also sug-
gested giving full independence to RBI in order to
achieve liberalization.70 Third, India should consoli-
date its financial system with a full deregulation of
interest rates in 1997/98, a gradual reduction in the
average effective CRR to 3 percent in 1999–2000,
and a decrease in gross NPAs to 5 percent. Fourth,
macroeconomic indicators should be monitored, par-
ticularly exchange rate, balance of payments, and
adequacy of reserves. Finally, the supervisory sys-
tem in the financial market should be strengthened
and greater autonomy should be given to banks and
financial institutions.71  Concerning the conditions of
liberalization, the Committee argued that over the
three-year period, external sector policies should be
designed to ensure a rising trend in the current-re-
ceipts-to-GDP ratio. The Committee also recom-
mended that the debt-service ratio be reduced to 20
percent.
Assessment of Cautious Capital Account
Liberalization
The conditionality of further capital account liber-
alization is aimed at ensuring the right sequencing of
reforms. In particular, the Committee felt that ex-
cessive capital inflows would lead to an excessive
expansion of bank balance sheets (as seen in Asia
and Latin America), resulting in a deterioration in
credit quality at banks and maturity mismatch as
short-term capital inflows are invested in long-term
or illiquid assets rendering repayment at short notice
impossible. Moreover, with the regulatory and
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prudential environment unprepared for an influx of
volatile foreign money, rapid capital account deregu-
lation would invite great potential instability. The Com-
mittee, as well as studies (e.g., Joshi and Little, 1996)
rightfully emphasized the importance of sequencing
the reforms correctly, with trade liberalization taking
the lead, followed by financial regulation and fiscal
consolidation. Only in the final stage would capital
account liberalization be advisable.
India was aware of the dangers of loosening up
its capital account too quickly, long before the Asian
economies ran into crisis. The crisis in Asia has vin-
dicated the Indian approach. Indeed, as a result of
the Asian crisis, India has delayed the implementa-
tion of the three-year phased program recommended
by the Committee. This appears to be a highly sen-
sible decision. More than that, in the light of recent
empirical evidence of the negative impact of capital
account liberalization in Asia, a wholesale review of
the premises and conclusions of the Committee ap-
pears necessary.
EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
From 1975 to 1992, the rupee exchange rate was
officially determined by RBI based on a weighted
basket of currencies of India’s major trading part-
ners. This was possible because of the severe re-
strictions on current and capital account transactions.
As a result of the 1991 balance of payments crisis,
however, the rupee was devalued twice, on 1 and 3
July 1991 (totalling 19 percent). From March 1992
to February 1993, a dual exchange rate system, the
Liberalized Exchange Rate Management System
(LERMS), was put in place. In March 1993, ex-
change rates were unified, marking the beginning of
the era of freely floating exchange rates in India.
Thus, from 1993 to 1996, India for the first time had
to deal extensively with questions of exchange rate
management.
Since 1995, a new package of measures has been
implemented in order to integrate and develop the In-
dian foreign exchange market. These are as follows:
• effective 3 July 1995, civil government debt ser-
vice payments were routed through the market;
• effective 4 October 1995, RBI discontinued quo-
tation of its buying and selling, and introduced a
system of only quoting its spot buying rate to any
authorized dealer (AD) on receiving a specific
request;
• effective 4 January 1996, the uniform limit of
Rs150 million on overnight positions of ADs was
removed and banks were allowed to operate on
the limits fixed by their management, but under
continued RBI monitoring.72
• starting October 1996, banks have been permit-
ted to provide foreign currency denominated loans
to their customers, mobilizing their pool of FCNR
(B) deposits. They were also advised that RBI
could call upon them at any time to report their
daylight positions and cases of frequent cancel-
lations and rebooking;73
• since early 1996 rules concerning ADs have been
relaxed sequentially. From April 1996, ADs have
been allowed to initiate cross currency positions
overseas and offer derivative products to enable
customers to hedge their external liabilities. From
August 1996, they have been allowed to offer
interest rate swaps, currency swaps, coupon
swaps, interest rate caps/collars, and forward
rate agreements without prior approval of the
Government or RBI.74  Since September 1996,
they have been permitted to offer certain op-
tions.75  Beginning April 1997, they have been
allowed to borrow from their overseas repre-
sentations, invest funds in overseas money mar-
ket instruments up to $10 million or, since Octo-
ber 1997, up to 15 percent of the tier-1 capital of
banks.76  They can now also arrange foreign ex-
change rupee swaps between corporations and
run a swap book within their open position/gap
limits without prior approval of RBI;
• in August 1997, FIIs were allowed to cover their
debt exposure in the forward market. In Octo-
ber 1997, this was extended to nonresident in-
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vestor depositors, concerning deposits held in
nonresident (external) rupee accounts (NRE[R]
A) and foreign currency nonresident (bank)
schemes (FCNR [B]); and
• exporters and foreign exchange earners are per-
mitted to keep 50 percent of their foreign ex-
change earnings in exchange earners’ foreign
currency accounts.
RBI feels that these measures have led to
considerable deepening and widening of the for-
eign exchange market and improved its integration
with other markets.
TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND INDUSTRIAL
POLICY REFORMS
Under India’s 70-year old foreign exchange scheme,
exporters who wish to sell their products abroad must
notify RBI. Since this scheme gives the authorities a
good idea about foreign exchange holdings among
exporters, it has helped prevent diversion of foreign
exchange reserves out of the country, as happened,
for instance, in Thailand in the 1990s, where no such
scheme exists.
Concerning trade, investment, and industrial poli-
cies, the main elements of the post-1991 reforms were
as follows:
• currency devaluation of 18 percent in June 1991.
By March 1993, the real depreciation of rupee
was 25 percent;
• scrapping of the licensing system controlling in-
ternal production in 1992. According to informal
RBI calculations, today more than 90 percent of
value added are estimated to be produced with-
out license requirement;
• abolition of the reservation of many areas of eco-
nomic activity for the State. Now all industries,
except six, have been opened to private owner-
ship;
• significant relaxation of restrictions on the inflow
of foreign capital and technology transfer. Up to
51 percent foreign participation in companies was
permitted automatically in 34 industries. Clearance
for higher levels or in industries outside the 34
were processed speedily and foreign equity in-
flows rose rapidly after 1991. Foreigners can now
own 30 percent of equity in industry and 20 per-
cent in banks without Government approval;
• substantial relaxation of restrictions on the large
industrial houses (designed to curb monopoly).
Consequently, large companies were able to ex-
pand existing units and construct new ones;
• abolition of quantitative restrictions on imports
of raw materials, intermediates, and capital
goods. Considerable restrictions on the import
of consumer goods remained, although by 1995
an increasing number of items was being put on
Open General License, but still subject to tariffs;
• sharp reduction in import tariff levels.77 The av-
erage tariff rate fell from more than 200 percent
in 1990 to 65 percent in 1994 and about 40 per-
cent in 1998 (although tariffs on consumer goods
remained comparatively high). The average
nominal tariff more than halved during 1990–
1994; and
• simplification of exchange controls and estab-
lishment of full currency convertibility of the ru-
pee on the trade account.
Issues for Investment and Trade Policies
In the past two decades a shift in industrial struc-
ture toward expansion of consumer durables sector
took place, fuelled by an expansion of middle income
purchasing power and increased openness to imports
and international taste patterns. However, at the same
time, there was a retreat from technology- and capi-
tal-intensive sectors in favor of resource- and labor-
intensive sectors. Unlike India’s previous decades
of growth, this put its structure more in line with the
static Heckscher-Ohlin model of international re-
source allocation and trade patterns. Instead, India
opted for the import substituting, dynamic type of
economic growth. With the recent structural changes
and reforms, however, India is at a policy crossroads.
The old postwar model has increasingly been
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dismantled. Despite the long-standing attempts to first
promote and then to protect small-scale industries
(SSIs), the share of this sector in industrial output is
now lower than in comparable countries. With the
declining importance of the import-substitution strat-
egy, some of its advantages are also in danger of
being lost. Thus, there is some evidence that there
has been a systematic drift toward lower levels of
labor productivity and toward sectors of lower skill
intensity (Kaplinsky, 1997; Nambiar and Tadas, 1994).
The change in industrial structure was associated
with increasing income inequality, drop in household
savings, and growth in the trade deficit, which in turn
helped trigger the economic crisis of 1991. More-
over, there is a question as to whether the changes in
the strategic orientation of the economy are consis-
tent with rising per capita incomes (Kaplinsky, 1997).
Despite these reforms, India’s investment policy
still faces tremendous challenges. A major problem
is that, notwithstanding high rates of investment, the
country’s infrastructure sector is relatively less de-
veloped than in other Asian economies. The recent
production slowdown in the infrastructure sectors has
added to the concerns that insufficient capacity and
inefficiencies in infrastructure use could increasingly
constrain production and exports. Although the im-
pact of infrastructure on economic growth is hard to
quantify, there are signs that industrial production has
already been hurt by frequent power shortages, par-
ticularly as far as smaller enterprises are concerned,
and that the recent slowdown in export growth is
partly related to port and transport bottlenecks.
Though faced with growing budgetary constraints,
the Government has sought to encourage private
sector investment—including foreign investment—
to supplement public investment. While some private
power projects have already been completed, the
overall impact of private participation has so far
been limited. There have been significant reforms in
industrial policy over the past years. Limits on inv-
estment in sectors reserved for SSI—plants and
machinery—were increased from Rs6 million to
Rs30 million. Export obligations for non-SSI enter-
prises producing reserved items were relaxed (from
75 to 50 percent), and a limited number of reserved
items were fully deregulated (14 out of a total of 850
items).
On the external trade front, India also continues
to face critical challenges. Its trade deficit widened
to 4 percent of GDP in 1996/97. After three suc-
cessive years of increases close to 20 percent, ex-
port growth in dollar terms fell to 5.3 percent in
1996/97. The deceleration was most pronounced in
manufactured goods, while exports of agriculture
products continued to do well. The slowdown has
reflected a range of factors: (i) the dwindling im-
pact of the exchange rate devaluation and trade
liberalization of the early 1990s; (ii) declining im-
port demand growth of partner countries (import
growth fell from 28 percent in 1995/96 to 6.7 per-
cent in 1996/97; (iii) structural problems faced by
the strongly export-oriented SSIs (which account
for roughly half of all exports); (iv) infrastructure
bottlenecks (notably in roads and ports); and (v)
temporary factors such as a sharp decline in world
diamond prices (affecting gems and jewelry exports)
and the tightening of domestic environmental regu-
lations that accounted for an estimated 4 percent-
age points of the slowdown.
Critics argue that India’s continuing problems
in trade and investment are due to lack of liberal-
ization. According to them, the list of policies that
have not yet been addressed remains long.78 How-
ever, there is a group of scholars that has begun to
argue that some of India’s problems with trade
and investment are due to the liberalization pro-
cess itself.
Assessment of Timing
and Sequencing of
Liberalization Process
Given that India had made the decision to liberalize its
domestic economy as well as its links with the world,
a step by step approach to accomplishing this has
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proven successful. Careful pacing and sequencing of
reforms makes economic and political sense. Shock
treatment has caused dislocation and social crisis in
Latin America and some countries of Eastern Europe,
including Russia. The Indian Government has been
more sensitive to the impact of reforms than many
other countries. Moreover, the order of liberaliza-
tion, with trade liberalization, financial regulation, and
fiscal consolidation taking priority, while capital ac-
count liberalization has been delayed until the last
stage of the reform program, has also been correct.
As a result, India has successfully weathered the
storms brought about by the Asian crisis.
Assessment of the Degree
of Globalization of the
Economy and Policy of
Gradual Liberalization
Degree of Globalization
MEASURES OF OPENNESS AND
THE DEGREE OF GLOBALIZATION
Trade
The ratio of India’s international trade to GDP, a
measure of its openness to foreign technology and
competition, increased at only about the median rate
for all developing countries between 1980–1983 and
1990–1993.79  In real terms, trade volumes relative
to real GDP rose by only about 0.1 percentage point
per annum, less than East Asia or Latin America.
With the trade liberalization of the 1990s, India’s trade
openness rose to about 0.75 percentage points per
annum between 1991 and 1994, although this was
still below the equivalent figure for East Asia and
Latin America (2 percentage points). Considering
simply the ratio of foreign trade to GDP in rupee
terms, this measure of openness and integration with
the world has risen significantly over the past decade:
from 11.6 percent in 1985/86 to 14.1 percent in 1990/
91, before increasing sharply to 19.6 percent in 1997/
98. This ratio is significantly larger than, for instance,
the equivalent ratio for Japan and some other Asian
countries, and it lends support to the thesis that India’s
economy has not only been more open than generally
believed, but is also opening up rapidly.
Trade Restrictions
Despite trade liberalization, the level of India’s
tariff and other trade restrictions remained among
the highest in the world even in the 1990s. In 1993,
the unweighted average tariff rates stood at about
60 percent (compared to regional median values of
about 14 percent in East Asia and Latin America).
Almost 50 percent of domestic production was esti-
mated to remain protected by nontariff barriers.80  In
East Asian countries, such as Korea, Malaysia, and
Thailand, quantitative restrictions covered less than
5 percent of tariff lines.
Foreign Direct Investment
FDI is also usually considered an indicator of glo-
bal integration, partly due to its potential role for dif-
fusion of technology and skills. India’s FDI inflows
have traditionally been low and they showed little
increase in the periods 1981–1983 and 1991–1993.
Brahmbhatt, Srinivasan, and Murrell (1997) observed
that the rate of increase, about 0.002 of a percent-
age point of GDP per annum, was about the same as
the median for all developing countries and signifi-
cantly below the equivalent ratio of 0.03 for East
Asia. The ratio of FDI to GDP, also a measure of
access to foreign technology and competition, only
increased at the median rate for all developing econo-
mies. FDI relative to GDP in purchasing power terms
in the early 1990s put India into the bottom third of
developing countries. In 1994/95, however, FDI
surged to an estimated $1.3 billion. In 1995/96, it rose
further to $2.1 billion, then to $2.7 billion in 1996/97.
The most recent data, for 1997/98, showed another
surge of FDI by 19 percent to $3.2 billion. Invest-
ment has, thus, reached levels that are significantly
above the median for all developing countries. FDI
into India overtook that to the Philippines and
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Thailand in 1997/98.81  It must therefore be concluded
that, taking FDI as a measure of globalization, India
has become significantly more open than in the past
and does not have to shy away from comparisons
with other Asian countries, let alone developing
economies in general.
Credit Ratings
Credit ratings of sovereign debt are sometimes
used as an indicator of access to international capital
markets of the country concerned.82  Higher country
ratings reduce the cost of overseas funding.83  Ac-
cording to Institutional Investor magazine, India is
among the developing countries with superior rating.
In the period 1993 to 1995, it already ranked 17th
among 93 countries. Since then, the sovereign debt
ratings of most Asian countries, as well as of many
Eastern European and Latin American countries that
have been affected by the fallout from the Asian
and emerging markets crisis, have been lowered
sharply. Even Japan’s sovereign rating has been
downgraded. India, on the other hand, has been far
less affected by the crisis and hence its rating has
not suffered as much. A downgrading after the
nuclear tests in the summer of 1998 seemed inevi-
table. However, in relative terms, compared to other
developing countries, India’s rating has actually im-
proved. Using credit ratings as an indicator of glo-
balization, India has been found to be in a leading
position among developing countries.
Share of Manufactures in Exports
The ratio of manufactures to total exports may be
used as a measure of access to technology learning
gains.84  By this measure, India’s performance has
been in the top quartile of all developing countries,
showing the fastest increase in the share of manu-
factured goods among exports over the 1980s, and
the highest levels of manufactured goods as a share
of exports in the early 1990s.85  Again, India’s inter-
nationalization is well advanced by this indicator.
INDIA’S DEGREE OF GLOBALIZATION AND
INTEGRATION INTO WORLD MARKETS
Brahmbhatt et. al. (1997) developed a “speed of in-
tegration index” from changes between the early
1980s and early 1990s in the real trade-GDP ratio,
the inward FDI-GDP ratio, the Institutional Inves-
tor credit ratings, and the share of manufactures in
exports. The index is defined by the simple average
of the changes in the four indicators expressed as
“standardized scores.”86  Using this index, they ranked
developing countries in four quartiles ranging from
“fast integrators” with the highest index values to
“slow integrators” with the lowest. The result was
that India falls in the “moderate integrator” category,
ranked number 34 out of the 93 developing countries
observed.
In a recent study of the postwar histories of more
than 90 developing countries, Sachs and Warner
(1995) classified a country as “open” if it satisfied
four criteria: (i) average import tariff rates of 40 per-
cent or less on intermediate and capital goods,
(ii) import quotas and licenses covering 40 percent
or less of total imports, (iii) a black market exchange
rate premium of 20 percent or less on average, and
(iv) no State monopolization of trade in the leading
exports. They found that India failed these criteria
by a wide margin since import tariffs were signifi-
cantly above 40 percent and import licensing cov-
ered virtually all international trade until the 1990s.
They considered India a closed, State-led economy
that fared very badly in the past 40 years.
Although Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have
been classified as countries that maintained open trade
(Thailand just got under the 40 percent tariff thres-
hold), based on the four criteria, fewer than 20 de-
veloping countries were always open to international
trade in the postwar period or from the time of their
independence (if that is more recent).87
Other researchers also concluded that India’s in-
tegration with the world economy in the decade to
the early 1990s was modest, its level of integration
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remained low and the degree of globalization lagged
behind other countries, especially when compared to
East Asian and Latin American economies.88
Reviewing the facts, it is clear that India has re-
mained reluctant to open up its economy with any
haste. Based on several indicators, India has remained
more closed and less integrated with the world than
many other developing countries, especially in East
Asia. However, as events since 1997 have demon-
strated, the lack of globalization and internationaliza-
tion has not been a disadvantage for India in the past
two years. Indeed, when future historians evaluate
India’s long-term economic performance, the lack
of speedy internationalization may well be com-
mended as one of the factors helping the country to
develop without too many hitches.
Assessment of Gradualist
Reform Policy
POLICY OF GRADUAL OPENING
Many researchers recommend that India abandon
its cautious stance toward globalization and rapidly
increase its degree of openness to the world. How-
ever, “openness” per se does not lead to sustainable
output growth, nor to high levels of employment and
desirable distributional patterns. Moreover, the links
between degree of openness or integration and eco-
nomic performance are not clear cut. First, while
increased international competition may enhance
welfare through productivity gains and comparative
advantage in some areas, many developing countries
may also suffer welfare losses, as many of their in-
digenous industries would be driven close to extinc-
tion. Thus, the overall welfare gain even in a com-
parative static analysis would not be clear. However,
moving on to a dynamic analysis that goes beyond
the static model of comparative advantage, it is clear
that developing countries can improve their long-term
welfare by using government intervention in order to
create new spheres of comparative advantage. This
requires that many infant industries be protected.
India’s advantage has been that it has had access to
a variety of indigenous raw mat-erial sources at home
that did not burden the balance of payments.89 Con-
sequently, its policy of Government-led economic
development did not require as large an emphasis on
export orientation. Therefore, adjusting for the vast
difference in India’s endowment with raw materials,
it is not clear that its economic development strategy
has been inconsistent with the general strategies fol-
lowed by the Asian miracle economies. It is, there-
fore, rash to praise the Asian strategy and dismiss
the Indian approach. Both were designed with the
same goals in mind and fundamentally follow the same
strategy (i.e., to use government intervention together
with market forces, in order to create a position of
dynamic comparative advantage).
The reform process initiated in 1991 brought far-
reaching change to the Indian economy, which
showed a strong performance in the following years.
There was a period of rapid growth between 1993
and 1996, with growth averaging 7 percent in fiscal
years 1995/96 to 1997/98. This strong performance
is often put forward as evidence that economic lib-
eralization increases the growth potential of the
economy. However, no such causal relationship could
be proven. Moreover, after 1996, the economy be-
gan to slow down, despite the Government’s lower-
ing of interest rates and other credit measures. Even
a star performer in the previous fiscal year such as
agriculture slowed during 1997/98. FDI, however, has
not dried up. It rose by 52 percent in the first 11
months of 1997 on a year-on-year basis. According
to a review of macroeconomic and monetary devel-
opments in 1997/98, given by RBI Governor Bimal
Jalan,90 there are different causes for concern. First,
the slowdown in industrial growth in the first half of
1997 turned out to be more persistent than originally
expected. Second, the dollar value of exports grew
by only 2.6 percent, compared to a 5.6 percent growth
in the corresponding previous period and in contrast
to an average growth of 20 percent from 1994 to
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1996. Third, there is a considerable slowdown in the
primary issue of equity in stock exchanges. Fourth,
the development in some Asian currencies brought
the exchange rate of the rupee under pressure. On
16 January 1998, a package of monetary measures
was introduced. It included a hike in the bank rate
from 9 to 11 percent and an increase in the CRR to
10.5 percent. The squeeze on liquidity, subsequently,
stabilized the rupee and it became possible to re-
verse some of the measures. Different from the cri-
sis India had before, the Deputy Governor of RBI,
Y.V. Reddy, called it “a crisis of currencies, corpo-
rate stocks and banking.” Evidence has since been
mounting that liberalization has its costs, and many
of these costs may be detrimental to balanced eco-
nomic development.
GRADUALIST CAPITAL ACCOUNT
LIBERALIZATION POLICY PREVENTED
FALLOUT FROM ASIAN CRISIS
RBI made it clear that India understood the danger
that lies in opening up the capital account, if it is done
too quickly. Bimal Jalan´s predecessor as governor of
RBI, Chakravanty Rangarajan (1997), pointed out two
lessons that India had learned from the Asian crisis.
First, when the current account deficit exceeds a cer-
tain level, countries become vulnerable to external
shocks. In this situation, India is not much better off
than most of the other Asian countries. Second, on
the financing of the current account deficit, when the
proportion of short-term debt to total debt becomes
high, countries become vulnerable as the former needs
to be rolled over in frequent intervals. Rangarajan
pointed to the case of Thailand, where the ratio of
short-term debt to total debt exceeded 32 percent. In
the case of India this ratio was about 7 percent.
The dangers of loosening up the capital account
too quickly are reflected in the size and composition
of the actual foreign debt balance. In India, the ratio
of nondebt creating inflows to debt-creating inflows
more than doubled in the period from 1991/92 to 1993/
94. The debt service ratio also went down from 35.3
percent in 1990/91 to 25.6 percent in 1993/94. Until
1996/97, this ratio stayed almost stable.
Such caution has clearly paid off, as the country
has not been as badly affected by the sudden with-
drawal of foreign investment as other Asian coun-
tries. Portfolio and FDI inflows into India have been
increasing steadily from only $133 million in 1991/92
to $6 billion in 1996/97 and, in the aftermath of the
Asian crisis, falling to a still sizable $4.8 billion. The
commendable feature, which clearly worked to
India’s advantage when the Asian crisis broke out,
was the comparatively low share of portfolio invest-
ment and the dominant role of FDI among these fig-
ures. As Table 1 shows, FDI dropped from 56 per-
cent of total foreign investment inflows in 1992/93 to
only 14 percent in 1993/94. However, that reduction
was due to the significant surge in equity investment
that was directed at emerging markets that year.
Absolute FDI continued its steady rise, and as port-
folio investment started to fall again, it regained its
dominant role. This can be seen in 1997/98 data, when
a sizable investment of $3.2 billion (67 percent of
total foreign investment) was accounted for by FDI,
a postwar record for India.
Table 1: Comparison of Foreign Direct Investment and Portfolio Investment
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 1997–1998.
Foreign Direct Investment Portfolio Investment Total
Year Amount ($ million) % Amount ($ million) % Amount ($ million) %
1991/92 129 97 4 3 133 100
1992/93 315 56 244 44 559 100
1993/94 586 14 3,567 86 4,153 100
1994/95 1,314 26 3,824 74 5,138 100
1995/96 2,133 41 2,748 59 4,881 100
1996/97 2,696 45 3,312 55 6,008 100
1997/98 3,197 67 1,601 33 4,798 100
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FDI is usually comparatively long term and, there-
fore, does not expose a country to the danger of sud-
den, simultaneous liquidation of foreign assets at short
notice, as portfolio investment does. India’s policy of
only gradually opening the capital account to free
flows, and the focus on initially encouraging FDI,
has clearly been superior to other countries’ prema-
ture and rapid opening to incoming portfolio and short-
term capital flows that have played such a large role
in exposing the East Asian economies to instability
and crisis. In the future, India should, therefore, be
encouraged to continue its cautious policy stance to-
ward opening up and integrating into the world
economy whose vagaries and volatilities have re-
cently become much more visible.
Policy of Gradual Liberalization
Together with the liberalization of regulations con-
cerning external transactions, many economists and
international institutions have been urging India to
liberalize its domestic economy. Indeed, the steps
taken since the reform package was launched in 1991
have been of historic proportions and have clearly
shifted India away from a regulated economy to-
ward one that is market oriented.
Even before the Asian crisis broke out, there had
been some evidence that market-opening and liber-
alization policies were not beneficial for India. For
instance, the criticism is often made that the range
of products produced in import-substituting econo-
mies is wider than would be the case had these
economies opened trade and taken advantage of
international specialization. However, on an aggre-
gate level, this could not be observed in India: the
trade-GDP ratio (the sum of imports and exports
over GDP) in 1992 was larger (19.7 percent) than
in the US (16.4 percent) (Kaplinsky 1997). How-
ever, researchers have found some evidence that
the lack of specialization has been visible on the
firm level. Kaplinsky (1997) and Jacobsson and
Ghayur (1994) argue that the large product range
of Indian firms has produced suboptimal scales of
production. The recognition of this problem was in-
deed a significant factor that led to the relaxation
of controls over the large industrial houses during
the 1980s. It is widely held that a more liberal trade
regime would induce a greater degree of interna-
tional specialization, thus also forcing local firms to
increase their specialization. However, Jacobsson
and Ghayur (1994) found that the problem of lack
of specialization became worse after the liberaliza-
tion process was set in train.
The rapid credit expansion and simultaneous de-
regulation policies of the 1980s induced a marked
shift in the relative growth of key sectors of the
economy. The primary growth sectors in the early
postwar era were metal based. However, by the
1980s, this had shifted to the petrochemical industry,
food processing, and electrical machinery. The prob-
lem is that the employment elasticity of growth had
dropped, since the petrochemical industries are highly
capital intensive. Moreover, the export intensity of
manufacturing also declined, as the domestic-resource
ratios in chemicals are higher than in metal-based
industries. This raised the rates of effective protec-
tion (Kaplinsky, 1997).
Coordination of Fiscal
and Monetary Policies
Unlike in many East Asian countries, the reforms to
liberalize the Indian economy were implemented in
synchrony with standing Government policies. In
particular, exchange rate policies were not out of line
with other economic policies. However, there is one
area where these policies were at fault in the period
leading up to the 1990/91 crisis, and where macro-
economic policies may once again become inconsis-
tent leading to misallocation of resources. This is the
coordination of monetary policy with other policies,
especially with fiscal policy.
Until the recent reforms, one important tool of
Government intervention in the financial system was
its legal power to force the central bank to monetize
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budget deficits by buying “ad hoc” Treasury bills.
This ensured coordination of monetary and fiscal
policies and minimized crowding out of fiscal policy.
The switch from automatic monetization to capi-
tal market funding has made the central bank more
independent. However, this switch has significantly
increased the funding cost for the Government. This
is due to the higher market interest rate, which also
includes a larger risk premium, which was fueled by
the rise in the deficit. Ironically, this rise has been
spurred by the very switch to market funding. The
increase in the Government’s funding costs has been
estimated at almost 1 percent of GDP. This has made
it harder for the Government to reduce the fiscal
deficit. In fact, the underlying fiscal deficit was cut
in 1997 and 1998, but the overall deficit was kept
high by the interest cost. As RBI now takes less
paper than in the past, total credit creation has slowed.
This may have helped cause economic slowdown in
1998.
The RBI has already been acting as central bank
and regulator of the financial sector. While many
voices support changes to render the RBI even
more powerful, there are some economists that ar-
gue in favour of maintaining a link between mon-
etary and fiscal policies, in order to ensure a high
degree of coordination between the two policies
(see Box).
Finally, the reduction of the SLR and introduction
of direct borrowing by the central and state govern-
ments have significantly reduced the degree of con-
trol that the central Government has had over state
government spending. In the past, state governments
were restricted by a quota of bonds that could be
bought by banks, determining to some extent state
government expenditures. But the reforms have
gradually allowed state governments to increase their
direct borrowing from the market. In five years, they
will be able to borrow without restrictions. This has
increased the danger of fiscal profligacy of certain
states, without much influence of the central Gov-
ernment over them.
Policy Recommendations
for Macroeconomic
Management
The Role of the Government:
Between Intervention and
Free Markets
Many economists favor India’s policy of moving to-
ward free markets and have been impatient with the
slow pace this is being achieved. Their analysis is
based on the crucial assumption that free markets
are always welfare superior. There is no doubt that
inappropriate government intervention can cause
great harm to economic development. However, eco-
nomic theory as well as empirical evidence over the
past decade have shown that even free markets do
not allocate resources optimally, as informational im-
perfections and externalities render markets skewed.
Opening up markets, especially the capital account,
exposed many Asian economies to forces that were
eventually highly detrimental to their welfare. India’s
interventionist policy stance seemed to have served
the country well. It must therefore be commended
for resisting the political pressures, often motivated
by sectarian interests or financial interests of leading
industrialized countries, to open up its markets and
“globalize” its economy. As the successful postwar
development experience of Japan and other East
Asian countries has shown, the key to success in
economic development, macroeconomic manage-
ment, and balanced resource allocation lies not in
unqualified free-market policies, but in the right com-
bination of market forces and appropriate govern-
ment intervention. In those countries, government
intervention did not focus on command-economy style
micromanagement of all transactions.
Regarding Indian trade, a strong case has been
made by economists that the decontrol of imports
had a negative effect on the economy. The argu-
ment put forward by Bouton (1998) that the first phase
of the reform process opened the economy to boom
27INDIAN MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT: AT THE CROSSROADS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
and bust and that the obstacles and pain of the next
phase will be greater still should provoke the ques-
tion why India should not go back to controls. Bouton’s
underlying assumption is that free markets per se
will compensate India for the pain on its way to free
markets. There is, however, no evidence that such
an assumption holds.
Free markets are not likely to benefit the poor
rural population in India. In order to help the agri-
cultural sector, the supply of credit should be in-
creased. This is what the Government has aimed at
and partly achieved as a result of its credit controls,
which must be commended and should not be dis-
continued.
Given the advanced state of India’s free market
reforms and the doubts about their wisdom, an
urgent review of this approach and the potential dan-
gers is called for so that India will not jeopardize the
successes of decades of economic development.
FISCAL POLICY
Appropriate state intervention does not require
budget deficits. The general principle should be to
allow large and expanding deficits only in times of
Central Bank Independence and Economic Performance: The Jury Is Still Out
That central bank independence is good for economic performance has become a widely held belief among economists and
policymakers. However, as there has been little, if any, empirical support for this argument, it remains an unproven hypoth-
esis. On the contrary, empirical research on the economic dislocation in Japan and Asia over the past years has revealed
that central banks made costly policy errors in an environment of excessive independence, lack of coordination of monetary
and fiscal policies, and lack of accountability. Therefore, when considering the case of central bank independence,
governments should carefully weigh its costs and benefits. They should take into account the need to coordinate monetary
and fiscal policies, the possible conflict of interest from concentrating economic power in an unelected body, and the need
for transparency and accountability in monetary policy decisions.
The logic of the hypothesis that greater central bank independence yields better economic performance is based on two
assumptions: first, that inflation is bad for economic welfare; second, that high inflation results from a lack of central bank
independence. The main empirical work supporting the second assumption is provided by Emerson et al. (1992) in a study
commissioned by the European Commission in a bid to launch an independent European Central Bank.* All papers in the
study arbitrarily select the countries and the time period, and construct an “index of central bank independence” based on
selected variables, such as the legal locus of central bank decision making on interest-rate policy. Most of the papers use a
similar index and a similar set of countries.
The validity of the first assumption is not examined in this brief discussion. But inflation is clearly not the only result of
central bank policies. Other important results concern economic growth and the rate of unemployment, as well as the
impact of the degree of coordination between monetary and fiscal policies. An independent central bank implies less
coordination. Hence, central bank policies that have resulted in low inflation but also in high unemployment and a long
economic slump (such as the policies of the Bank of Japan in the 1990s) would be deemed commendable in most studies
like Emerson’s by virtue of the framework they employ, despite the fact that the policies have been socially suboptimal.
Even if one were to accept the view that low inflation is the only goal of the central bank, it is not evident that such a goal is
achievable only by independent central banks. A paper by Forder (1998) examines the above empirical study critically.
Forder does not question the choice of countries or time period, the design of the “index of independence,” or the general
methodology of the papers. He is merely concerned with determining whether the authors’ data were applied correctly
within their framework. Finding significant errors in the use of the data, Forder adjusts for the errors and concludes that
there is “no evidence for a clear correlation between low inflation and central bank independence.” According to him, there
is “no basis” for the hypothesis that central bank independence improves economic performance.
On the contrary, there is evidence that bad economic performance, for instance in the case of Asian countries, has been
due to excessive de facto (if not de jure) independence of the central bank. Werner (1998, 1999) conducted detailed
empirical research on the decision-making process behind the key monetary policy variables that led to the creation of the
bubble in Japan in the 1980s. He found that, contrary to common belief, the Bank of Japan acted completely independently in
determining these variables (namely the quantity of central and commercial bank credit), yet its policies resulted in asset
inflation. There is also evidence (see the detailed Nukul Commission report, 1998) that the Bank of Thailand acted largely
independently in making the key decisions that led to the crisis in Thailand. Both central banks were nonetheless rewarded
for their lack of accountability and the lack of coordination between their policies and those of the government by being
made even more independent and powerful through legal changes. On the other hand, India, which was not affected by the
Asian crisis, has a central bank with fewer de facto powers than those of Japan and Thailand.
*Its methodology is based on Alesina (1989), Alesina and Summers (1992), and similar papers, which in turn are based on an unpublished paper by Parkin and Bade (1980).
Cukierman (1992) and Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) take another approach, but Mangano (1997) raises doubts about the accuracy of their data.
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economic recession, at which time the monetization
of these deficits must be ensured. In times of eco-
nomic recovery and high growth, every effort should
be made to balance the budget. The macroeconomic
danger of continued deficits is that purchasing power
is diverted for consumptive purposes, and not pro-
ductive purposes (such as investment). This would
depress the potential growth rate. The necessary
policies, however, should not focus in a one-sided
way on cutting expenditures. In particular, this should
be initiated only without damaging public funds for
human resource development and poverty-allevia-
tion programs. Reducing subsidies, particularly for
fertilizers, readjusting oil prices, and achieving fur-
ther consolidation at central Government levels should
be undertaken together with continuing the tax re-
form process—especially improving tax administra-
tion and collections. Further, extending the tax base
and increasing the role of personal income taxes must
be pursued. Total tax collection amounts to only about
16 percent of GDP. In a country in which the middle
class is estimated to number between 100 million and
200 million, there are only about eight million taxpay-
ers. In order to improve efficiency and reduce debt,
privatization of public enterprises can be considered
in industries, where the absence of externalities al-
lows private sector activity to be welfare equivalent
to Government firms. This should be decided on a
case-to-case basis. It certainly makes sense to priva-
tize areas where the Government has no compara-
tive advantage, where there are few natural monopo-
lies, and no problems with externalities, or where
goods and services are offered that have no public
goods character. For instance, it is hard to argue that
the Government should continue to run hotels, espe-
cially when they are losing money. It must be kept in
mind that privatization represents a one-off sale and
so the Government should not rely on it too much in
order to increase state revenues.
At state level, further fiscal consolidation should
introduce cost recovery programs (particularly in
water and power), and contain the growth of current
expenditure. The Planning Commission, which, in
fact, plays the role of a development bank, should
ensure that the transfers it authorizes are used for
the intended purposes and that borrowed resources
are utilized only for such expenditures that yield a
return adequate to meet the cost of borrowing.91  Fis-
cal adjustment by the states has been worse than
that of the center.92
Concerning the role of the state in the pension
system, privatization is likely to be beneficial. A fully
funded pension system would enable funds to pur-
sue long-term objectives. They could thus match their
assets and liabilities by financing long-term invest-
ment by buying 30-year bonds. The introduction of
pension funds, provident funds, insurance funds, and
a certain degree of competition between them would
be advisable. Currently, two Government-owned
firms maintain a monopoly, which has enabled the
Government to siphon off the revenues of these long-
term investments for deficit financing. This is not a
wise policy, as it only creates funding problems in
the future. A switch to a fully funded system that
does not allow the Government access to the funds
is required.
Administrative Reform
The Government has an important role to play in
designing the organizational environment of the pri-
vate sector and intervening in markets to enhance
resource allocation (especially using the credit mar-
ket). However, for the Government to be able to ef-
ficiently implement such policies, Government insti-
tutions themselves must be designed in the appropri-
ate way, so that incentive structures ensure the uni-
fication of individual goals and overall desired out-
come. One area of inefficiency appears to be a lack
of means testing. While the Government allocates
funds, the basic management is done by the munici-
palities and local authorities, with limited monitoring
of expenditures and actual services provided. There
are few checks if benefits actually reach the tar-
geted beneficiaries or development sectors.
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For example. while agriculture provides employ-
ment to two thirds of the employed workforce and
accounts for 30 percent of GDP, the Government
hardly invests in it directly. There are projects to sup-
port farmers, such as the Integrated Rural Develop-
ment Program and the Prime Minister’s Employment
Generation Program. However, only about 15 per-
cent of the programs reach the small farmers, the
key target group. The Government price stabiliza-
tion scheme, whereby the Government buys grains
and foods at higher prices and sells them at lower
prices, tends to help only the larger farmers that
manage to supply the Government. A Rural Micro-
enterprise Program aims at lending to school leavers.
The inefficiency of such programs is a big problem.
Only 15 percent of the program funds paid reaches
the targeted group while 85 percent is spent for ad-
ministration.
A particular problem of the current organization
of the Indian public sector is the distribution of deci-
sion-making power, as well as resource allocation,
between the central Government and the various state
governments.93  Expenditures are shared more or less
equally between the central Government (in charge
of defense, space, research, large food and fertilizer
subsidies, and state assistance) and state govern-
ments (which spend on infrastructure, social wel-
fare, and education). While the central Government
has introduced fiscal cost cutting measures, such as
the increase of the retirement age of civil servants
from 58 to 60 years, it has little leverage in control-
ling state deficits, as the states can borrow directly
from the market. Irrigation, national highways, so-
cial infrastructure (with exception of major national
projects), mines and minerals, and most local utilities
fall under the responsibility of the States. Thus, re-
forms to increase the market-orientation must also
operate at the state level.
Another problem is the lack of coordination among
public sector entities. This has been a problem espe-
cially in infrastructure, such as transport and com-
munications. There are various ministries that deal
with these issues (Ministry for Surface Transport,
Ministry of Railways, and Ministry of Aviation), but
there is no single Government institution orchestrat-
ing the efforts of these ministries. The Planning Com-
mission is a good candidate as it could unite central
and state government planning in order to coordinate
planning of infrastructure improvement projects.
Moreover, administrative reform should create a cen-
tral Ministry of Transport. Another issue is power
supply. There is no coordination between transport
and power policies, for instance, stunting the electri-
fication of railways.
Keeping the Economy
Close to the Noninflationary
Potential Growth Rate
Economic activity is only possible if purchasing power
is exerted, or, in simple words, if money is spent.
However, not all money that is spent has a net posi-
tive effect on the economy. Net positive effects are
the result of the creation of new purchasing power.
Economic growth only occurs if the total amount of
net purchasing power in the economy increases.
New net purchasing power can only be cre-
ated by the central bank and the commercial bank-
ing system through credit creation. Given the in-
formational imperfections in the credit market, it has
been demonstrated that a free credit market will not
ensure optimal resource allocation, particularly from
a development and welfare optimization policy per-
spective. The credit market, therefore, does not only
require appropriate Government intervention in or-
der to enhance economic welfare and growth; it is
also the ideal tool for minimalist, top-down interven-
tion. Instead of abandoning the system of credit con-
trols, India should refine and improve it. First, the
government should conduct a cost-benefit analysis
of the pros and cons of greater central bank inde-
pendence. Second, the mechanism for credit alloca-
tion should be made explicit and transparent. Third,
its component should be a target for overall, nonin-
flationary credit creation, with maximum ceilings for
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the allocation of this new purchasing power among
the various sectors of the economy. Preference
should be given to sectors of the economy that are
highly productive and sectors where the allocation
of resources would increase overall welfare. Mean-
while, the reforms to increase regulatory, supervi-
sory, and prudential structures in the banking system
should continue. However, it is important to keep the
prudential limits low enough for the banking system
to be able to meet the overall credit growth targets.
In particular, since Indian banks do not have much
presence in international financial markets, there is
hardly any need to follow the high Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS) capital adequacy ratio
(CAR). Most banks in the second largest economy
in the world (the regional banks in Japan), for in-
stance, are not required to keep the 8 percent CAR.
It seems, therefore, to border on the irrational to de-
mand this from Indian banks, especially when the
proven effect has been to reduce banks’ willingness
to lend.
The principle of overall credit growth targeting
should be to aim at keeping the economy close to its
potential growth rate. After an estimate of the po-
tential growth rate has been made, credit growth tar-
gets should be set so as to keep nominal GDP growth
in line with them. This minimizes inflation.
The declared main aim of RBI monetary policy is
to keep inflation in check.94 However, there is evi-
dence that this view, which has indeed gained popu-
larity with central banks, is not necessarily in the best
interests of an economy whose aim is noninflation-
ary growth maximization. A key issue is, therefore,
the main goal of monetary policy. Is it really wise to
focus single-mindedly on inflation reduction or infla-
tion targeting, when nominal GDP growth is low or
deflation poses a potential threat? Keeping the
economy close to its maximum potential growth rate
can be achieved by targeting nominal GDP instead
of inflation. Such a policy minimizes unemployment
and loss to national welfare. If demand growth threat-
ens to rise above the potential growth rate, then in-
flationary pressures would be a danger and the cen-
tral bank should aim to slow economic growth. If
demand growth is below the potential growth rate,
then deflationary pressures are a danger and the
central bank should aim to expand economic growth.
Of course, in such monetary policy targeting, the
determination and measurement of the potential
growth rate is important. This should be supported
by structural policies aimed at increasing the poten-
tial growth rate.
Many central banks, including RBI, have been
arguing that more independence is necessary in or-
der to enhance economic welfare. The implicit as-
sumption is that central banks aim at maximizing
economic welfare. However, this argument is again
based on the reasoning that a one-sided focus on
inflation reduction is welfare-enhancing. The evi-
dence in support of such an argument is not clear-
cut (see Box).
In contrast, the experience of de facto indepen-
dent central banks in Japan and Thailand of the 1990s,
as well as the US experience of the 1930s, has dem-
onstrated that independence, especially when com-
bined with lack of both transparency of decision mak-
ing and accountability for actual policies can be
instrumental in not only creating the environment for
major economic crises, but also exacerbating and
prolonging them. The policy to concentrate all regu-
latory, supervisory, and monetary policy decision-
making power in the hands of one single institution,
RBI, which at the same time lacks mechanisms for
accountability, transparency, and checks-and-balances,
needs a review. It cannot be denied that the historical
record of central banks has been to create boom/bust
cycles. Why this was so and what mechanism should
be put into place to prevent this, needs further re-
search before conclusive answers can be given.
Boosting the Noninflationary
Potential Growth Rate
Structural policies should aim at maximizing poten-
tial growth, while monetary policy should aim at keep-
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ing the economy close to this maximum potential.
Potential growth is a function of the quantity of fac-
tor inputs (land, labor, capital, and technology) and
the quality of their use (factor productivity).
In the East Asian experience, the first thrust of
growth-enhancing policies has focused on factor-in-
put mobilization. This policy emphasis will be suc-
cessful as long as all resources are not yet fully mo-
bilized. This is likely to be the case in India.
Policies for increasing workforce participation and
quality include enhancing the educational standards
of the population, while maintaining equal opportuni-
ties. This calls for public education at low or zero
cost to the beneficiary. Such policies should continue
to remain at the top of the macroeconomic policy
agenda, and should not be sidelined by a misguided
focus on free markets. This set of policies also in-
cludes increasing health and welfare of the popula-
tion and direct measures to alleviate poverty.95  For
instance, education fees are extremely low and if
linked to parent-income, could be raised at least for
the higher income groups. Government hospitals are
free for all, but could have differential pricing for
different income groups. Electricity is usually sup-
plied for free to agriculture.96 Identifying, introduc-
ing, and supporting measures to promote labor-in-
tensive agricultural production may increase farm
exports and job creation. Typically, measures that
attempt to increase farm product quality and mar-
keting are accompanied by labor demand increases.
Organizing farmers in production cooperatives and
associations may also contribute to their ability to
deal with poverty alleviation.
Policies aimed at improving land utilization should
include a review of the Urban Land Ceilings Act.
Currently, no land in urban areas can be sold, bought,
or leased without specific Government approval, the
allocation of which has been less than efficient. Ur-
ban planning and Government regulation of the land
market is, however, necessary to maximize gains
and minimize negative externalities from land use
decisions.
Increasing all factor inputs does not necessarily
ensure fast economic growth. They must be com-
bined efficiently to enhance productivity. Policies to-
ward that goal include improving transport and com-
munication infrastructure. For India, the rapid intro-
duction of modern telecommunications and comput-
ing networks is likely to prove a cost-effective way
of leapfrogging in terms of infrastructural develop-
ment. On transportation infrastructure, an effort must
be made to address severe bottlenecks.97 Due to lack
of investments in recent years, insufficient capacity
has become particularly evident in such sectors as
power generation, roads, and ports.
Dealing with the World
India’s policies have been largely successful in deal-
ing with the world. This shows that its policies to
restrict capital flows, as well as to adopt a flexible
exchange rate regime are appropriate. India should
be wary of running a current account deficit higher
than 3.5 percent of GDP unless long-term export
growth can be stepped up significantly above 10 per-
cent a year. This is valid even if capital inflows are
not debt creating. While such inflows have better
risk-sharing characteristics, they do require a rate of
return considerably higher than the interest rate on
bonds.
Monitoring the overall size of inflows is desir-
able, and instruments to moderate short-term in-
flows (such as reserve requirements and taxation
of profits) should be kept in place. Liberalization of
outflows by residents over and above the neces-
sary freedom to repatriate inflows, would be risky
until fiscal adjustment is complete and political com-
mitment to convertibility is strong enough to rule
out its abandonment.
Devaluation in a large and unindexed economy
such as India is not an important cause of inflation,
which is driven in India mainly by agricultural pro-
duction, money supply growth, and fiscal deficits.
Therefore, the exchange rate regime as managed in
1996/97—floating rates with the nominal exchange
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rate targeted for achieving the real exchange rate
which yields a sustainable current deficit—is a sen-
sible strategy over the medium term, when capital
movement is likely to be volatile.
One important question concerning trade policy is
how far imports should be liberalized. As already
outlined earlier, complete import liberalization does
not seem to be a feasible option for the near future.
With fully liberalized imports, the ratio of imports to
GDP would increase, and this in turn would require
higher inflows of foreign capital, which can be very
volatile. Furthermore, the level of foreign debt has to
be watched in order not to make India too dependent
on foreign capital. Reform of the Indian trade sector,
therefore, has to be achieved without raising the im-
port ratio in the short run.
One possible solution was introduced by Bimal
Jalan as early as 1991. Jalan (1991) believes that the
least risky strategy available for India is to boost ex-
ports first and liberalize imports afterwards. To
achieve this, the balance of profitability should be
shifted in favor of exporters.
With budgetary constraints likely to persist in the
future, the additional burden of export subsidization
should be shifted to importers. This could be done by
making use of the replenishment license mechanism
for financing imports.
The prevailing import control system is that of “ac-
tual user” in which domestic manufacturers are al-
lowed to import raw materials and components, irre-
spective of whether sales are made at home or
abroad. The replenishment license mechanism pro-
vides an additional import facility to exporters, which
is linked to the value of exports. These licenses can
be used to import a wider range of commodities and
they are freely tradable in the market with a pre-
mium. The exporter could sell the licenses to import-
ers and would be provided with an additional sub-
sidy. Jalan’s underlying idea is to make all import
permits conditional on replenishment licenses. This
would mean a step by step reduction of the actual
user licenses in favor of the replenishment licenses.
A number of important advantages would likely ac-
crue.98
This policy would only indirectly mean a move
away from interventionism, though. Traditionally, in-
terventionism concerning trade was realized by im-
posing high import duties. Even though these import
duties might decline, as market forces will then partly
contribute to allocation, this will only take place be-
cause of a change in the tool for intervention. It would
be a shift from micro-intervention to an intervention
that only sets a framework. The quality of interven-
tion, however, would be much higher than before.
The Indian Government would create a framework in
which Indian companies could act freely, providing a
chance to deregulate the domestic market first and
get ready to slowly open up the economy instead of
doing it hastily. Furthermore, competition used as an
incentive is likely to result in high efficiency.
Unlike its East Asian neighbors, India’s compara-
tively moderate external borrowing and constant
watch on the rupee exchange rate may have helped
avoid an economic crisis. Severe restrictions on FIIs’
activities may have also contributed to its preven-
tion. Given the scale of the country and neighbouring
region, India harbors enormous potential for devel-
opment and growth.
Actual Policy Responses
to the Financial and
Currency Crisis in Asia
Comparison of Key Macro Features
Between India and Affected Asia
The financial and currency crisis that erupted in South-
east Asia in 1997 has not failed to make an impact
on India’s economy. However, India has clearly
avoided being drawn into the crisis to a degree com-
parable to that of the Southeast Asian countries, such
as Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. This is
not entirely surprising. There are fundamental dif-
ferences between India and these countries.
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IMPORTANCE OF EXTERNAL SECTOR
The external sector as a percentage of GDP is small
in India compared to Southeast Asian economies.
Exports accounted for only 10.3 percent of nominal
GDP in 1996/97.99
SIZE OF CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT
The current account deficit fell from 1.8 percent of
GDP in 1995/96 to 1.2 percent in 1996/97. In
1997/98, it rose to 1.7 percent. Meanwhile, foreign
exchange reserves have been increasing from
$22 billion in 1995/96 to $26 billion in 1996/97
and $29 billion in 1997/98, covering about seven
months of imports in 1996/97 and almost eight months
in 1997/98.
DEGREE OF FOREIGN INDEBTEDNESS
In 1996/97, India’s total external debt stood at
$93.43 billion and thus ranked India eighth among
developing countries in terms of total indebtedness.100
However, India’s debt-gross national product (GNP)
ratio was only 28 percent, far below that of Indone-
sia (67 percent), Thailand (56 percent), Malaysia (49
percent), and Philippines (49 percent).101 The ratio
of short-term debt to total debt has been small due to
restrictions on short-term capital inflows. In 1996, it
stood at only 7.5 percent, one of the lowest among
developing countries and significantly lower than
the countries affected by the Asian crisis.102
The ratio of short-term debt to the level of reserves
(STD/FER), probably the single most reliable indica-
tor of a country’s vulnerability to a balance of pay-
ments crisis, amounted to only 0.23 in 1995/96, 0.26
in 1996/97, and an even lower 0.20 in 1997/98.103
Usually a ratio of more than 1 is a sign that a country
is exposed, because a sudden withdrawal of short-
term funds would quickly threaten default on foreign
liabilities.104 The Indian STD/FER ratios are a far
cry from the high 1.47 that the country recorded in
1990/91, just before its solvency crisis. Moreover,
they are significantly lower than the corresponding
figures for any of those countries that were hit by
the financial crises. In June 1997, Thailand’s
STD/FER was 1.45, Korea’s 2, and Indonesia’s
1.7—reliable warning signals of possible solvency
problems.105 Meanwhile, India’s net external com-
mercial borrowing as a percentage of total capital
flows fell from 43 percent in 1995/96 to only 10.6
percent in 1996/97. Total external debt as a percent-
age of GDP continued its decline after the 1991 cri-
sis. At that time, it had reached 41 percent, but by
1995/96 it had fallen to 28.3 percent. From there, it
fell further to 26.2 percent in 1996/97 and 26.4 per-
cent in 1997/98. Debt service payments, having risen
to 3.6 percent in 1994/95 and 1995/96 (from 3.3 per-
cent in the years from 1991/92 to 1993/94), decreased
again to 3.3 percent in 1996/97 and 2.8 percent in
1997/98.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE POLICY
While RBI has not been above active market inter-
vention to influence the rupee’s international value,
India’s foreign exchange regime has largely been de-
termined by supply and demand for foreign exchange.
This allows for a two-way movement in the exchange
rate and does not provide opportunities for one-way
bets by speculators. The latter was a problem for vir-
tually all Southeast Asian economies, with the excep-
tion of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and
Hong Kong, China as they continued to defend the
pegs despite signs of overvaluation.
EXCESSIVE CREDIT CREATION
A root cause of the financial crisis in Asia has been
the fact that virtually all the Southeast Asian econo-
mies (including the PRC and Hong Kong, China)
experienced excessive domestic credit expansion for
nonproductive use (especially speculation in the real
estate sector). This created asset price inflation and
heavily exposed the domestic banking sectors to the
threat of NPLs. While excessive credit creation was
to some extent a problem in the propagation of the
1991 Indian balance of payments crisis, no such phe-
nomenon has occurred in the 1990s. Real estate
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lending by Indian banks has remained modest by In-
dian and international standards and indeed pruden-
tial requirements for the banking system were al-
ready in the process of becoming stricter and more
comprehensive even before 1997.106
CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION
In India, far fewer domestic financial transactions
have been given to foreign players compared with
most affected Southeast Asian countries. Not only
have there been strict caps on external commercial
borrowings, especially of a short-term nature, but also
restrictions on the end-use of such borrowings. More-
over, India did not allow foreign investors to borrow
or lend in the domestic money markets at all. While
this closed nature of key aspects of Indian financial
markets, especially the remaining capital controls, has
been severely criticized, it is now clear that the rela-
tive conservatism of Indian financial markets insu-
lated the country well from contagion as the Asian
crisis evolved.
Overall Impact of the Asian
Financial Crisis on India
Despite the above fundamental differences be-
tween India and the rest of the region, Indian finan-
cial markets could not remain entirely unaffected
by the crisis. As India is a rapidly developing econo-
my in Asia, since the crisis broke out in 1997, it has
often been lumped together with the other econo-
mies of Southeast Asia. This has been felt in the
Indian stock market.
EXCHANGE RATE
The rupee has not experienced a depreciation com-
parable to the affected Southeast Asian economies.
On the contrary, its gradual depreciation merely shows
the continuation of a trend that began much earlier,
and the rate of decline in the value of the rupee has
actually decelerated. In 1995/96, it fell by 6.1 per-
cent (to Rs33.45/$), in 1996/97 by 5.8 percent (to
Rs35.50/$) and in 1997/98 by only 4.5 percent (to
Rs37.16/$). Despite occasional speculative attacks,
the flexible exchange rate system has not provided
currency speculators with a clear target. Compared
to the sharp depreciation of its Southeast Asian com-
petitors, the Indian exchange rate has become stron-
ger. This has been reflected in a sharp appreciation
of the real effective exchange rate (REER). Ac-
cording to the Ministry of Finance, the REER vis-a-
vis the top ten trading partners rose, on an Index
with base 100 for 1985, from 52.41 in 1996, to 56.57
in 1997. However, this is not dramatically above the
54.67 recorded in 1994.107
EXTERNAL TRADE
Due to the collapse of their domestic economies, a
slowdown in imports by the Southeast Asian coun-
tries was inevitable. However, this occurred at a time
when fewer imports were demanded by India’s ma-
jor trading partners (accounting for 56 percent of
Indian exports in dollar terms). Export growth to these
countries declined from 13.4 percent in 1994 and
18.2 percent in 1995 to 3.6 percent in 1996 and prob-
ably even less in 1997. The combined effect of this
slowdown in external demand and the REER appre-
ciation resulted in a deceleration of export growth
from a modest 5.3 percent in 1996/97 to a sluggish
1.5 percent, according to the provisional 1997/98 data.
However, the deceleration in export growth was less
pronounced in special drawing rights (SDR) terms.
Exports in SDR terms grew 10.8 percent in 1996/97
and 6.7 percent in 1997/98 (provisional), although
down from 13.6 percent in 1994/95 and 16.7 percent
in 1995/96. Moreover, India’s export slowdown
comes against the backdrop of a global export slow-
down in dollar terms, to 3.7 percent in 1996, after
19.8 percent growth in 1995 and 13.7 percent in 1994.
However, unlike countries such as Thailand, whose
exports contracted by 1.3 percent in 1996, India’s
exports grew by 5.3 percent in 1996/97 and 1.5 per-
cent in 1997/98 in dollar terms.
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BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
A slowdown of Indian imports has followed that of
exports continuing a pattern of recent years. After
growing by 22.9 percent in 1994/95, and 28 percent in
1995/96, import growth dropped to 6.7 percent in 1996/
97 and 4.2 percent in 1997/98. This was mainly due to
weak domestic demand and a slowdown
in industrial activity. Consequently, the overall balance
of payments did not deteriorate markedly in 1997/98.
Policy Response to the Asian
Crisis
As the Asian crisis broke out, RBI intervened to curb
speculation and influence market expectations in or-
der to prevent drastic deviations from the fundamen-
tals. RBI made it clear that it was ready to intervene
in the foreign exchange market to moderate volatil-
ity, if necessary. However, since the rupee had re-
mained stable in the precrisis period (or even appre-
ciated at times), many market participants began to
substitute domestic debt with foreign currency bor-
rowings to take advantage of interest rate arbitrage.
Others kept their oversold or short positions un-
hedged. Consequently, when the Asian crisis broke
out in July and August 1997 and international foreign
exchange volatility and risk aversion rose, there was
increased demand to liquidate FCNR bank funds and
a rush to cover unhedged positions. This pushed the
rupee down by 2.5 percent by the first week of Sept-
ember 1997 and forward premiums firmed visibly
during this period. RBI intervened in both the spot
and forward segments of the market to prevent sharp
depreciations and reduce volatility. The intervention
appeared to have been successful, as the rupee sub-
sequently appreciated from about Rs36.60 to the
Rs36.20 range against the dollar in the third week of
September and remained near these levels until the
second week of November 1997. At that time, the
second phase of the Asian financial crisis hit and
market volatility soared again. Thus the rupee was
pushed down by about 9 percent between Novem-
ber 1997 and January 1998. Since market interven-
tion proved insufficient to cool down expectations of
further depreciation.  RBI implemented a series of
measures (Table 2).  As a result of monetary mea-
sures announced on 16 January 1998, the rupee be-
gan to stabilize and market expectations about fur-
ther depreciations were reversed successfully.  The
rupee appreciated from RS40.36/$ by the end of the
same month.
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Table 2: List of Policy Measures Undertaken by the Reserve Bank of India in the Aftermath of the Asian Crisis
a The rate of interest on post-shipment rupee export credit (other than against overdue export bills) for the period beyond 90 days and up to six months is 13 percent per annum
effective 1 January 1998. Hence, the position prevailing prior to 26 November 1997 was restored.
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
Category/Date of Policy Decision Particulars
Cash Reserve Requirement
28 November 1997 Deferment of future program of bringing about a reduction in cash reserve requirement
2 December 1997 Increase in cash reserve requirement by 0.5 percentage points to 10 percent effective
from fortnight beginning 6 December 1997
16 January 1998 Increase in cash reserve requirement by 0.5 percentage points to 10.5 percent with
effect from fortnight beginning 17 January 1998
23 March 1998 Decrease in cash reserve requirement by 0.5 percentage points to 10 percent from
10.5 percent in two phases of 0.25 percentage points from fortnight beginning 28
March 1998 and 11 April 1998
Nonresident deposits
2 December 1997 Abolition of 10 percent incremental cash reserve requirement on nonresident external
rupee accounts and nonresident reserve deposit schemes with effect from 6 Decem-
ber 1997
Repurchase operations
2 December 1997 Introduction of fixed rate repos at 4.5 percent to absorb surplus liquidity
4 December 1997 Raising the interest rate on fixed rate repos to 5 percent effective 3 December 1997
11 December 1997 Raising of interest rate on fixed rate repos to 6.5 percent
16 January 1998 Raising the interest rate on fixed rate repos to 7 percent
16 January 1998 Raising the interest rate on fixed rate repos to 9 percent
17 March 1998 Making available reverse repos facility to primary dealers in Government Securities
market at bank rate on discretionary basis and subject to stipulation of conditions
relative to their operations in the call money market
Reduction of the interest rate on fixed rate repos from 9 to 8 percent
Export Credita
26 November 1997 Increase in interest rate to 15 percent on postshipment rupee export credit on usance
bills for period (comprising usance period of export bills, transit period, and grace period
wherever applicable) beyond 90 days and up to six months from the date of shipment
28 November 1997 Application of the 15 percent interest rate on postshipment rupee export credit from the
date of advance. Exporters were expected to take advantage of the time gap available
up to 15 December 1997 by expediting realization of their export proceeds
17 December 1997 Imposition of interest rate of 20 percent per annum (minimum) on overdue export bills
from the date of advance. In case of demand bills and shorter-term usance bills, the
higher rate of interest was not applicable where the total period of credit including the
period of overdue is less than one month from the date of bill/negotiation
31 December 1997 Imposition of interest rate of 20 percent per annum on overdue export bills only for the
overdue period and not from the date of advance. Rate will not be applicable with
respect to certain chronic cases (where even six months ago, the bills were overdue)
Surcharge on Import Finance
17 December 1997 Imposition of interest rate surcharges of 15 percent of the lending (excluding interest
tax) on import finance
16 January 1998 Increase in the interest rate surcharge on import finance from 15 to 30 percent
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Appendix 1
Recommendations of the Committee on Banking Sector Reforms,
April 1998
The key proposals include the following:
Concerning capital adequacy, the committee suggests
that banks be required to mark the entire portfolio of
Government securities to market. Moreover, the risk weight
attached to Government and other approved securities
should be raised from 0 to 5 percent. The risk weight for
Government advances should be the same as for other
advances. Foreign exchange open positions should be
incorporated into the calculation of risk weighted assets
and receive a 100 percent risk weight. Finally, overall
capital adequacy norms should be raised (the Basle ratio
should be increased from 8 to 10 percent.) The Reserve
Bank of India (RBI) should be given the authority to raise
this further for individual banks, if it deems necessary. The
Committee recommends that public sector banks should not
receive additional capital from the Government to meet
these requirements but should “be encouraged” to raise
these funds from the markets, “at home or abroad.” Also, it
recommends smaller banks to merge as a way to meet
stricter capital adequacy requirements.
Concerning asset quality, the committee recommends
tightening of definitions of nonperforming assets (NPAs)
further, e.g., by including advances covered by Govern-
ment guarantees, that have “turned sticky” and which, in
the absence of such guarantees, would have been
classified as NPAs. It also recommends increasing
regulatory pressure on banks to quickly dispose of
nonperforming loans (NPLs) and full tax deductability of
provisions, although it again warns against recapitalization
via Government money.
Directed credit has not been abolished, as recom-
mended by the Committee on Financial System (CFS ) in
1991. The Committee on Banking Sector Reforms argues
that directed credit has been responsible for a significant
amount of NPLs held by banks. However, it recognizes the
importance of small-scale credit to small and marginal
farmers and tiny businesses that otherwise would not be
able to obtain purchasing power. While stopping short of
repeating the CFS recommendation of abolition of directed
credit, the Committee asks for the abolition of any interest
rate subsidy on directed credit.
On disclosure requirements, the Committee argues that
income recognition, asset classification, and provisioning
norms should apply even to Government-guaranteed
advances. Moreover, it calls for disclosure of the maturity
pattern of assets and liabilities, as well as the publication of
consolidated bank group balance sheets. The Committee is
asking banks to improve their systems and methods,
especially concerning information processing, accounting,
controlling, automation, as well as their credit analysis, loan
review, asset-liability management, treasury management,
and human resource management.
The Committee recommends the continuation of licensing
new private banks and allowing foreign banks to set up
subsidiaries or joint ventures in India. Among the legal
issues that are currently dealt with are bank loan recovery
instruments, bankruptcy and insolvency code, as well as
mortgage law and legal steps to facilitate mortgage-backed
securities and other forms of securitization.
Finally, the Committee argues that the independence of
RBI should be strengthened and that it should be made
independent of the Government. This should be done via
changes in the Banking Regulation Act and the Reserve
Bank of India Act, as well as the State Bank of India Act.
(The Committee laments: “The Banking Regulation Act is
structured on the premise that bank supervision is
essentially a Government function and that RBI’s position is
somewhat on the lines of an agent. The Act
also provides appellate powers to the Government over
the decisions of RBI in this regard and original powers in
certain instances. The Committee feels that these provi-
sions should be reviewed” [Chapter VIII, para 8.17]).
The Committee, as well as RBI, argues that banks
should be provided with greater freedom concerning their
deposit/lending operations. Although interest rates on
domestic term deposits were deregulated in 1997, a
restriction was imposed on banks that they must offer
deposits of the same maturity irrespective of the size of
such deposits. Another change will concern the lending to
small- and medium-size enterprises. Up until now, there is a
strong disincentive to lend to those sectors because of the
administered rates of interest. In order to remove the
disincentive from the flow of credit to small borrowings
below Rs2 lakh, instead of prescribing a specific rate
uniformly for all banks, it is being stipulated that the interest
rates on loans below Rs2 lakh should not exceed the prime
lending rate (PLR), which is available to the best borrowers
of the concerned bank. Furthermore, all advances against
term deposits should be at an interest rate equal or below
the prime lending rate.
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
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Appendix 2
Credit and M3 vs. Gross Domestic Product
Given the severe data limitations and with the availability
only of annual gross domestic product (GDP) series, it
seems futile to employ a sophisticated set of statistical
specification tests. Hence, the empirical research
methodology adopted is that of eye inspection of
correlation.a Figure A2.1 shows nominal GDP growth
plotted against the M3 money supply measure. Figure A2.2
shows nominal GDP growth plotted against commercial
bank credit growth. Even employing this simple
methodology, the credit approach appears superior.
Credit and India’s Crises
The first severe problem with regard to inflation
occurred in 1965 and 1967. In June 1966, mainly under
foreign pressure, a devaluation-liberalization-package was
introduced. The stance in credit policy, however, did not
change. In both years primary credit creation by the central
bank increased and with it inflation rose.
The second crisis began in 1972. Inflation was
20.8 percent in 1973 and 26.8 percent in 1974. The
severe droughts in 1972 and 1974 were considered the
main reasons for the high inflation. But as in the first crisis,
credit creation seemed to have played a major role also in
the period 1972–1974. After a decrease in RBI credit to the
commercial sector in 1972 by 2.3 percent, it rose by a
stunning 73.1 percent in 1973, the sharpest rise in RBI
credit to the commercial sector since 1961. After 1973,
credit declined and with a lag of about one year, inflation
dropped as well. The measures introduced by the
Government in July 1974, which consisted of tough fiscal,
monetary (based on M3), and income measures, therefore,
cannot be seen as the sole solution to the inflation problem.
In order to show the influence money can have on inflation,
Joshi and Little (1994) explained the fall in prices with the
tight monetary policy that started in September 1973. While
Joshi and Little were mainly concerned with M1 and M3,
credit seemed to have had a greater influence. M3 fell by
only 6.2 percentage points, whereas credit decreased by
45.8 percentage points from 1973 to 1974.
The next crisis started in 1979, when inflation began to
rise again. Inflation peaked in 1981 at 12.5 percent and
again in 1983 at 12.6 percent. In November 1981, India
entered an extended agreement with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). This agreement enabled India to
withdraw SDR5 billion over a three-year period. Ceilings
were set for net bank credit to Government and total
domestic credit. Furthermore, total foreign non-IMF
borrowing was restricted. Before the IMF loan, credit
ceilings set by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) for individual
banks were consistently exceeded. RBI credit to the
commercial sector picked up after 1981, instead of
declining. This seems to be the reason for the increase in
prices that began in 1982. M3, however, declined in the
period from 1981 to 1982. In 1982, credit increased by
8.8 percent and, in 1983, it even went up by 25.8 percent.
Prices also peaked again in 1983. M3 rose in 1983. During
the whole period, banks exceeded their credit limits and
that of RBI.
The period 1985–1989/90 can be seen as the road to
the next crisis. In 1989/90 there was a strong agricultural
recovery. Exports also boomed because of the devaluation
of the rupee. Imports increased by 10 percent (dollar value)
partly due to the continuation and extension of import
liberalization. The situation is different from the crises
before, which showed credit expansion in periods of
droughts. This time, credit expansion took place during a
time of agricultural recovery. RBI’s “credit to commercial
sector” expanded in 1989 by 30.1 percent. Inflation peaked
one year later, with a 13.7 percent increase. This cannot be
explained by a drought. Credit policy, however, showed the
same stance as in the crises before. One major outcome of
the crisis of 1990 is that RBI strengthened its position with
the agreement concerning the “ad-hoc” Treasury-bills
(T-bills). It can be seen as a first step toward an inde-
pendent monetary policy. The Government gave up its tool
of monetizing its fiscal deficits by “ad-hoc” T-bills, because
of the central bank argument that this automatic monetiz-
ation would cause inflation. RBI, however, neglects to
mention the explosive rise of credit to the commercial
sector (as opposed to the Government sector). M3 does
not seem to account for price behavior throughout the
entire period.
a See also Thon (1998). Source: Thon (1998).
Figure A2.2: GDP vs. Commercial Bank Credit
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Source: Reserve Bank of India.
GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Reserve Bank of India.
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Appendix 3
Import Tariffs
Even during the late 1980s, mean nominal import tariffs in
India were comparatively high.
Table A3.1: Mean Nominal Tariff Rates in India,
Pakistan, Brazil, and Thailand in Late 1980s
India Pakistan Brazil Thailand
Item (1988) (1988) (1989) (1985)
Mean 141.20 65.60 43.00 33.80
Standard Deviation 50.40 53.20 19.10 27.30
Coefficient of Variation 0.36 0.81 0.44 0.81
Source: Aksoy (1992), as quoted by Kaplinsky (1997).
The collection rate of Indian tariffs grew further during
the 1980s (from less than 50 to more than 80 percent
during 1978–88), according to Kaplinsky (1997). As a
result, import duties as a percent of imports increased from
29.7 percent in 1980 to 61.9 percent in 1987 and import
duties as a percentage of tax revenues rose from
24.8 percent to 34.8 percent during the same period.
This placed India into the highest import tax bracket in the
developing world (for a selected international comparison,
see Aksoy, 1992).
However, in the late 1970s and mid-1980s, the
Government lowered its effective protection rates and
nontariff barriers. Yet, a really significant reduction in
protection was only felt after the introduction of the new
economic policy in 1991. The majority of nontariff barriers
was abolished (e.g., restricted lists) and tariff rates were
lowered. The policy was visibly successful. The average
weighted nominal tariff rate fell from 141 percent in 1988
to 33 percent by 1994/95.
Table A3.2: Weighted Average Nominal Tariffs
(percent)
No. of
Item 1990/91 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95  Items
Consumer Goods 164 144 na na 1,347
Intermediate Goods 117 55 40 31 2,337
Capital Goods 97 76 50 38  988
Economy 87 64 47 33 5,040
na = not available.
Source: World Bank (1995).
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Appendix 4
Principal Capital Account Restrictions
Regulations and Objectives
Direct Investment
• Industrial policy liberalized on 24 July
1991 to attract larger foreign direct
investment (FDI) in infrastructure and
other critical economic sectors.
• Bulk of FDI still subject to discretionary
approval by the Foreign Investment
Promotion Board (FIPB).
Portfolio Investment
• Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs)—
pension funds, mutual funds, etc.—
allowed to purchase stocks and
debentures on local exchanges (since
July 1991) and to invest in unlisted
securities (since August 1996).
International Capital Market
Activity and Foreign Borrowing
• Gradual opening by the Government
of avenues for external commercial
borrowing and international equity
issues. (This is to provide access to
international capital markets while
containing external indebtedness and
debt service obligations and to
moderate the potential impact of
capital surges in macroeconomic
conditions.)
Foreign Exchange Market
• General:
– access to foreign exchange
regulated under the Foreign
Exchange Regulation Act (1973)
amended in 1993; and
Permitted
• Automatic approval by the Reserve
Bank of India (RBI) for FDI and trading
companies primarily engaged in export
activities.
• Up to 51 percent of equity permitted
for FDI in 57 capital-intensive, high-
technology industries and up to 100
percent in selected power projects.
• Nonresidents of Indian origin or
overseas corporate bodies allowed to
invest up to 100 percent of equity in
the list of high-priority industries with
repatriability of capital and income and
up to 51 percent of equity in unlisted
companies.
FII investment
• In all listed securities in primary or
secondary markets in India as well as
unlisted securities.
• In longer-term Government-dated
securites.
• Up to 100 percent of funds in
corporate debt.
• Access to international capital market
through Euro-equity issues (global
depository receipts [GDRs]) given to
Indian companies with a track record
of financial performance (three
years).
• Requirement may be waived for
companies investing in infrastructure
industries.
• External commercial borrowing subject
to Ministry of Finance approval with the
following requirements/conditions:
– seven years minimum average
maturity (MAM) except loans for
infrastructure financing (where
MAM is set at five years);
– set indicative ceiling for total app-
rovals ($8 billion for 1997/98); and
– short-term loans/credits maturing
witihin a year for import/export trade
financing. (Financing for up to three
years maturity subject to RBI
approval).
• Access to foreign exchange market
for bona fide current payments.
Restricted
• FDI for industries not on the automatic
list (requires clearance from the FIPB
on a case-to-case basis).
• Dividend remittance on FDI on
consumer goods industries (required
to be balanced by export proceeds
over a period of seven years from
initial investment).
• Outward direct investments by
residents (automatic approval for
Indian joint ventures in cases involving
equity of up to $4 million).
FIIs
• Holding of Treasury bills.
• Access to the forward foreign
exchange market.
• Investment exceeding 30 percent of
any company.
Residents
• Placing portfolio investments abroad
from domestic income.
• End use of GDR receipts is regulated
(No more than 25 percent can be used
for general corporate restructuring).
• Issuance of money market instru-
ments abroad.
• For nonresidents, issuance of
securities in the local market.
• Holding of foreign exchange by the
public (residents under obligation to
offer foreign currency receipts for
sale to authorized dealers [ADs]).
Exporters may retain 20% of savings
though exceptions may be given.
Activities
Continued next page
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Source: International Monetary Fund, India: Recent Economic Developments, 1998.
Regulations and Objectives
– foreign exchange market activity
strictly tied to underlying current
account and permitted capital
account transactions.
• ADs appointed by RBI to provide
competitive foreign exchange
services (in spot and forward
markets) for bona fide transactions.
• Responsible for many aspects of
compliance with foreign exchange
controls.
Nonresident Account
• Regulated by RBI to attract foreign
exchange while minimizing the impact
of net flows on the external balance.
Permitted
• General commitment made by India in
August 1994, based on the provisions
of Article 8 of the IMF agreement.
• Spot and forward foreign exchange
dealings:
– write cross-currency options on a
matched basis; and
– maintain positions in convertible
currencies and balances abroad.
• Opening of foreign exchange position
limits and forward gap limits agreed
with RBI on a bank-to-bank basis.
– use of derivatives to hedge risks on
their own portfolio: purchase hedge
“investments” for corporate clients;
– carrying out rupee swaps within
ADs’ open position/gap limits; and
– on lending of foreign currency
funds obtained under foreign
currency nonresident (bank)
(FCNR)[B]) schemes.
• Accounts offered to nonresidents
depending on use and include rupee
and foreign currency, repatriable and
nonrepatriable. (From 1994/95, income
accruing on nonrepatriable accounts
may be considered repatriable.)
Restricted
• Restrictions counter to Article VII
including dividend remittances and
bilateral payment arrangements.
• Access to international interbank
markets (lending/borrowing abroad is
subject to a ceiling of $10 million to/
from overseas officer or correspond-
ents).
• Writing options on the rupee.
• Opening of accounts abroad by
residents.
Activities
Appendix 4
Principal Capital Account Restrictions (Cont’d)
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1980/81 to 1990/91 to
1989/90 1994/95
Item (10 years) (5 years) 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97a 1997/98a
Real GDP (% change) 5.9 5.1 6.2 7.8 7.2 7.5 5.0
Industrial Production (% change)
  (base: 1993/94 = 100)b 7.4 5.3 6.0 8.4 12.7 5.6 6.5
Agricultural Production (% change) 3.8 2.4 3.8 4.9 (2.4) 9.4 (3.7)
Foodgrains Production (million tons) 146.5 180.0 184.3 191.5 180.4 199.3 194.1
Gross Domestic Savings Rate (% of GDP) 20.0 23.5 22.7 25.6 25.3 26.1 na
Gross Domestic Investment Rate (% of GDP) 22.0 25.0 23.3 26.9 27.1 27.3 na
Central Government Finances (% of GDP)
  Total Revenue 17.2 16.6 16.1 16.6 15.1 15.7 16.6
  Total Expenditure 18.8 17.9 17.5 16.7 15.9 15.7 16.6
  Revenue Deficit 1.8 3.2 4.0 3.2 2.7 2.6 3.1
  Fiscal Deficit 7.2 6.7 7.4 6.0 5.4 5.2 6.1
  Monetized Deficit 2.2 0.9 … 0.2 1.8 0.2 0.9
  Interest Payments 2.8 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.7 4.6
  Internal Debt 26.5 28.6 30.3 27.7 27.5 27.0 27.3
Monetary Aggregates (% change)
  Broad Money (M
a
) 17.2 18.2 18.4 22.3 13.7 16.2 17.6
  Narrow Money (M
L
) 15.1 19.0 21.5 27.5 11.7 12.0 11.1
  Reserve Money 16.8 17.0 25.2 22.1 14.9 2.8 13.1
Scheduled Commercial Banks (% change)
  Aggregate Deposits 18.1 18.3 17.3 22.8 12.1 16.5 19.7
  Bank Credit 16.8 16.1 8.2 28.7 20.1 9.6 16.4
  Non-Food Credit 17.8 15.2 5.7 29.8 22.5 10.9 15.1
  Investments in Government Securities 19.4 22.9 33.3 16.3 12.4 20.2 17.7
Wholesale Price Index (% change)
  Point-to-Point 7.5 10.8 10.8 10.4 5.0 6.9 5.3
  Average 8.0 10.7 8.4 10.9 7.8 6.4 4.8
Consumer Price Index (% change)
  Point-to-Point 8.9 10.6 9.9 9.7 8.9 10.0 8.3
  Average 9.1 10.4 7.3 10.3 10.0 9.4 6.8
BSE Sensitive Index (% change) 22.3 42.9 0.1 37.1 (17.3) 5.5 9.9
Trade and Balance of Payments
  Exports in $ (% change) 8.1 10.0 20.0 18.4 20.8 5.3 1.5
  Imports in $ (% change) 7.2 7.3 6.5 22.9 28.0 6.7 4.2
  Current Account (% of GDP) (2.0) (1.4) (0.4) (1.1) (1.8) (1.2) (1.7)
  Capital Account (% of GDP) 1.7 2.5 3.8 3.0 1.4 3.1 2.9
Foreign Exchange Reservesc ($ million) 5,579 13,865 19,254 25,186 21,687 26,423 29,367
External Debt ($ million) na 90,162 92,695 99,008 92,679 93,431 94,404
  Debt-GDP Ratio na 35.9 35.8 32.3 28.3 26.2 26.4
  Debt Service Ratio na 28.8 25.6 26.2 24.3 21.2 19.5
Exchange Rate (Rupee/$)
  High 7.73 17.28 31.21 31.37 31.32 34.14 35.70
  Low 17.13 32.65 31.49 31.97 37.95 35.96 40.36
BSE = Bombay Stock Exchange, GDP = gross domestic product.
(  ) = negative values are enclosed in parentheses, na = not available, … =  negligible.
a Provisional.
b Base 1980/81 = 100 for the first three columns.
c As at the end of the period.
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 1997–1998.
Average
Appendix 5: Statistical Tables
Table A5.1: Selected Macroeconomic and Financial Indicators
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Table A5.3: Consumption Expenditure (percent change)
At Current Prices At 1980/81 Prices
Category 1995/96 1996/97 1995/96 1996/97
Private Final Consumption Expenditure in the Domestic Market 12.8 13.2 5.3 5.8
Government Final Consumption Expenditure 15.4 14.0 4.8 5.1
Source: Central Statistical Organization, as quoted in Economic Survey 1996–1997, Ministry of Finance.
Appendix 5
Table A5.2: Sectoral Growth Rate and Share of Gross Domestic Product
GDP = gross domestic product.
(  ) = negative values are enclosed in parentheses.
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 1997–1998.
Year Agriculture Mining Industry Services GDP Agriculture Mining Industry Services
1970/71 44.5 1.3 22.4 31.9
1971/72 (1.9) 2.6 2.9 3.7 1.0 43.2 1.3 22.8 32.7
1972/73 (5.0) 5.9 3.6 2.9 (0.3) 41.2 1.4 23.7 33.8
1973/74 7.2 1.3 2.0 3.3 4.6 42.2 1.4 23.1 33.4
1974/75 (1.5) 4.9 1.8 4.0 1.2 41.1 1.4 23.2 34.3
1975/76 12.9 12.1 5.1 6.8 9.0 42.6 1.4 22.4 33.6
1976/77 (5.8) 3.6 9.1 4.8 1.2 39.6 1.5 24.2 34.8
1977/78 10.0 3.1 6.9 5.1 7.5 40.5 1.4 24.0 34.0
1978/79 2.3 2.7 9.2 6.8 5.5 39.3 1.4 24.9 34.4
1979/80 (12.8) 1.1 (3.3) 1.8 (5.2) 36.2 1.5 25.4 37.0
1980/81 12.9 12.2 3.0 3.2 6.8 38.2 1.6 24.5 35.8
1981/82 5.9 13.5 7.6 6.0 6.5 38.0 1.6 24.7 35.6
1982/83 (1.2) 11.5 4.3 6.5 3.1 36.4 1.8 25.0 36.8
1983/84 10.8 2.7 9.2 5.2 8.2 37.3 1.7 25.2 35.8
1984/85 0.0 1.4 6.3 6.3 3.9 35.9 1.6 25.8 36.6
1985/86 0.2 5.5 4.5 7.4 4.1 34.6 1.7 26.0 37.8
1986/87 (1.7) 13.5 6.9 7.6 4.3 32.6 1.8 26.6 39.0
1987/88 0.4 3.4 6.6 6.1 4.3 31.4 1.8 27.2 39.6
1988/89 16.3 15.0 8.7 7.3 10.6 33.0 1.9 26.7 38.4
1989/90 1.7 7.3 10.5 8.9 6.9 31.4 1.9 27.6 39.1
1990/91 3.8 10.7 7.0 5.2 5.4 30.9 2.0 28.0 39.1
1991/92 (2.3) 3.7 (1.7) 4.9 0.8 30.0 2.0 27.4 40.7
1992/93 6.1 1.1 4.4 5.5 5.1 30.2 2.0 27.2 40.6
1993/94 3.6 2.0 7.2 7.3 6.2 29.5 1.9 27.4 41.2
1994/95 4.6 8.1 9.5 7.5 7.8 29.0 1.9 28.0 41.3
1995/96 (3.0) 8.4 13.8 11.1 7.2 26.0 1.9 29.5 42.6
1996/97 7.9 (0.3) 6.9 8.1 7.5 26.1 1.7 29.4 42.8
1997/98 (2.0) 6.3 5.7 8.8 5.0 24.4 1.7 29.5 44.4
Annual Growth Rate (%) Share of GDP (%)
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Table A5.5: Composition of Capital Account Inflows (percent)
(  ) = negative values are enclosed in parentheses.
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Report on Currency and Finance 1997–1998.
Nondebt Debt
Creating Creating Other
Year Inflows Inflows Capital Total
1990/91 1.4 81.8 16.8 100
1991/92 3.6 85.6 10.8 100
1992/93 14.3 44.1 41.6 100
1993/94 43.6 19.5 36.9 100
1994/95 52.5 23.4 24.1 100
1995/96 100.4 56.0 (56.4) 100
1996/97 51.7 65.8 (17.5) 100
1997/98 44.7 46.0 9.3 100
Table A5.6: Growth Rates of Industrial Production, by Industry (percent)
(  ) = negative values are enclosed in parentheses.
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 1997–1998.
Year Mining and Quarrying Manufacturing Electricity Total Industrial Production
1994/95 7.6 8.5 8.5 8.4
1995/96 9.5 13.8 8.1 12.7
1996/97 (2.0) 6.7 4.0 5.6
1997/98 5.7 6.6 6.8 6.5
Appendix 5
Table A5.4: Trade Balance, Current Account Balance, and Capital Account
Balance (percent change)
GDP = gross domestic product.
(  ) = negative values are enclosed in parentheses.
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 1997–1998.
Year Trade Balance Current Account Capital Account Balance Trade Balance Current Account Capital Account Balance
1994/95 (0.9) 190.9 (5.6) (3.0) (1.1) 3.0 
1995/96 (11.9) 75.1 (48.9) (3.5) (1.8) 1.4 
1996/97 (12.4) (36.8) 125.0  (3.5) (1.1) 3.0 
1997/98 (14.5) 108.4 12.6  (3.9) (2.1) 3.2 
Percent Change Percent of GDP
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Appendix 5
Table A5.7: Credit to Priority Sectors
Year Agriculture Small-scale Industry Other Priority Sectors Agriculture Small-scale Industry Other Priority Sectors
1982/83 5,275 4,486 2,561
1983/84 6,144 5,447 3,308 16.47 21.42 29.17
1984/85 7,657 6,608 4,142 24.63 21.31 25.21
1985/86 9,057 7,816 4,692 18.28 18.28 13.28
1986/87 10,588 9,103 5,368 16.90 16.47 14.41
1987/88 12,009 10,820 6,241 13.42 18.86 16.26
1988/89 13,948 13,127 7,132 16.15 21.32 14.28
1989/90 16,526 15,543 8,314 18.48 18.40 16.57
1990/91 16,750 17,181 8,984 1.36 10.54 8.06
1991/92 18,187 18,158 9,124 8.58 5.69 1.56
1992/93 19,963 20,026 9,843 9.77 10.29 7.88
1993/94 21,208 22,617 10,055 6.24 12.94 2.15
1994/95 23,980 27,612 12,549 13.07 22.09 24.80
1995/96 27,044 31,884 14,401 12.78 15.47 14.76
1996/97 31,442 35,944 17,494 16.26 12.73 21.48
1997/98 34,869 43,508 21,130 10.90 21.04 20.78
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Report on Currency and Finance, 1997–1998.
Amount (Rs Crore) Percent Change
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Appendix 5
Table A5.8: Operations of India’s Central Government
Item 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1996/97 1997/98
Amount (Rs billion)
Total Revenue and Grants 795.3 796.0 1,016.9 1,173.4 1,412.6 1,372.8 1,641.7
Net Tax Revenue 540.4 534.5 674.5 819.4 973.1 972.1 1,133.9
Gross Tax Revenue 746.4 757.4 922.9 1,112.4 1,321.5 1,323.2 1,536.5
Less: State Share 205.9 222.9 248.4 293.0 348.4 351.1 402.5
Nontax Revenue 245.7 251.6 331.9 342.6 431.4 388.7 496.8
Of which:
Divestment Receipts 19.6 (0.5) 56.1 14.0 50.0 5.0 48.0
Grants 9.2 9.9 10.4 11.4 8.1 12.0 11.0
Total Expenditure and Net Lending 1,197.1 1,398.6 1,593.9 1,775.8 2,035.3 2,004.1 2,296.0
Current Expenditure 961.5 1,128.6 1,271.1 1,467.0 1,677.4 1,649.1 1,896.3
Of which:
Major Subsidies 94.1 107.6 115.3 121.3 147.2 142.3 171.3
Interest Payments 310.8 367.4 440.6 500.3 600.0 585.0 680.0
Capital Expenditure and Net Lending 235.6 270.0 322.8 308.9 357.9 355.0 399.9
Overall Balance (401.7) (602.6) (577.0) (602.4) (622.7) (631.3) (654.5)
Financing 401.7 602.6 577.0 602.4 622.7 631.3 654.5
External (net) 53.2 50.7 51.5 3.2 24.6 25.9 24.3
Domestic (net) 348.5 551.8 525.6 599.2 598.1 605.4 630.2
Oil Coordination Committee (OCC) Balance (5.1) (1.5) 12.8 (19.6) (8.0) (97.8) (35.0)
Overall Balance Including OCC Account (406.8) (604.1) (564.2) (622.0) (630.7) (729.1) (689.5)
Overall Balance Excluding Divestment Receipts (421.3) (602.1) (633.1) (616.4) (672.7) (636.3) (702.5)
Nominal GDP 7,059.2 8,097.7 9,536.8 10,958.8 12,522.4 12,523.8 14,402.3
Percent of GDP
Total Revenue and Grants 11.3 9.8 10.7 10.7 11.3 11.0 11.4
Total Expenditure and Net Lending 17.0 17.3 16.7 16.2 16.3 16.0 15.9
Current Expenditure 13.6 13.9 13.3 13.4 13.4 13.2 13.2
Of which:
Major Subsidies 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2
Interest Payments 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.8 4.7 4.7
Capital Expenditure and Net Lending 3.3 3.3 3.4 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.8
Overall Balance (5.7) (7.4) (6.1) (5.5) (5.0) (5.0) (4.5)
Overall Balance including OCC Account (5.8) (7.5) (5.9) (5.7) (5.0) (5.8) (4.8)
Overall Balance Excluding Divestment Receipts (6.0) (7.4) (6.6) (5.6) (5.4) (5.1) (4.9)
Memorandum Items:
Net Resources Transferred to States 6.8 6.9 6.2 6.0 6.0 6.1 5.7
Primary Balance (1.3) (2.9) (1.4) (0.9) (0.2) (0.4) 0.2
Consolidated Public Sector Balance (9.5) (10.7) (9.0) (9.0) (8.5) (9.2) (8.2)
GDP = gross domestic product.
(  ) = negative values are enclosed in parentheses.
Source:  International Monetary Fund, India: Recent Economic Developments, 1998.
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Table A5.9: Central Government’s Financing of Gross Fiscal Deficit
(percent of total finance)
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 1997–1998.
Internal Finance
91-day $ Total Total
Market Other Treasury Internal External Finance/Gross
Year Borrowings Liabilities Bills Finance Finance Fiscal Deficit
1990/91 18.0 49.5 25.4 92.9 7.1 100
1991/92 20.7 45.5 18.9 85.1 14.9 100
1992/93 9.2 47.0 30.6 86.8 13.2 100
1993/94 47.4 26.0 18.2 91.6 8.4 100
1994/95 34.8 54.6 1.7 91.1 8.9 100
1995/96 54.9 28.3 16.3 99.5 0.5 100
1996/97 30.0 45.8 19.7 95.5 4.5 100
1997/98 49.2 46.7 2.7 98.6 1.4 100
1998/99 53.1 44.3 0.0 97.4 2.6 100
Table A5.10: Financing of State Governments’ Gross Fiscal Deficit
(percent of deficit)
a Provisional.
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 1997–1998.
Loans from Gross
Central Market Fiscal
Year Government Borrowing Others Deficit
1990/91 53.1 13.6 33.3 100
1991/92 49.6 17.5 32.9 100
1992/93 42.7 16.8 40.5 100
1993/94 46.3 17.6 36.1 100
1994/95 53.3 14.7 32.0 100
1995/96 47.1 18.7 34.2 100
1996/97 47.5 17.6 35.0 100
1997/98 47.3 13.9 38.8 100
1998/99a 48.7 12.9 38.4 100
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Notes
1About two thirds of foreign liabilities were official bor-
rowing.
2The change in consumer price index (CPI) for industrial
workers averaged 11.6 percent in 1990/91, 7.6 percent for
agricultural workers, and 11 percent for urban nonmanual
employees. The wholesale price index (WPI) rose by 10.3
percent for all commodities. Broken down, it increased by
13 percent for primary articles, 8.4 percent for manufac-
tured goods, and 12.3 percent for energy.
3Kumar (1993), Kaplinsky (1997).
4The margin requirement was raised to more than 100 per-
cent, sometimes 300 percent, in order to induce credit ra-
tioning.
5The views of Joshi and Little (1994) of the World Bank
are representative of this conclusion: “The major mistake
of macroeconomic policy lay in neglecting the danger signs
evident in 1985/86 on the fiscal front. Fiscal deterioration
was allowed to proceed apace…By the end of the decade,
the macroeconomic fundamentals were out of joint. Even
a strictly temporary shock like the Gulf War was enough
to trigger a full-scale crisis.”
6The radical, “shock therapy” approach that favors imme-
diate, full-scale implementation of reforms is based on two
crucial assumptions. First, it assumes that after the initial
policy-induced recession (with the aim to squeeze domes-
tic demand in order to reduce imports and thus restore
balance of payments equilibrium), the economy will stabi-
lize quickly and there will be immediate gains in productiv-
ity and efficiency, which will lead to a sustained economic
recovery without a rise in the trade deficit. This assumes
that the balance of payments crisis was triggered by ex-
cessive consumptive demand, such as due to Govern-
ment spending. While this was partly the case, a neglected
complication is the increasing dependence of important
sectors of Indian industry on imports of capital goods
and components. Second, it assumes that large losses of
employment and real income will be accepted without po-
litical resistance. The gradualists felt that neither of these
assumptions was realistic and that “shock therapy” would
therefore do more harm than good. Fortunately for India,
the gradualists prevailed against strong outside pressure
to implement radical reforms. This held India in good stead
during the financial crisis that engulfed much of the rest
of Asia in 1997.
7The sharp downturn in agricultural production was partly
due to bad weather (though falling short of an outright
drought), which also had an indirect secondary impact on
industrial production.
8This was partly the result of the improvement in the bal-
ance of payments, induced by the squeeze on domestic
demand and recovering exports and the fact that rising for-
eign exchange reserves remained largely unsterilized, thus
increasing the domestic credit expansion of the central bank.
9Today, there are 64,000 commercial bank branch offices
and 37,000 branches of nonbanking financial institutions
(NBFIs). Of the commercial banks, 27 are in public hands,
accounting for 84 percent of current deposits and 91 per-
cent of branches. In addition, there are 35 private sector
banks and 42 foreign banks. Moreover, in the regions there
are 196 regional rural banks and 1,200 cooperative banks
(district cooperative societies).
10In October 1988, the ceiling rate for general lending by
commercial banks was replaced with a floor rate. Interest
rate controls on corporate debentures were removed and
the fixed lending rate of development financial institu-
tions was converted to a floor rate in August 1991.
11In a speech at the Bank Economists’ Conference on 6
October 1997.
12From 31 March 1993, banks had to classify loan assets
into defined groups on the basis of objective criteria and
make provisions on a specified basis against each group.
Between March 1993 and March 1995, a new income rec-
ognition criterion was phased in, which does not recog-
nize income by banks on loans or facilities with interest
unpaid for more than 180 days.
13However, there is still a ceiling on interest rates to small
firms, which must receive loans at the prime lending rate,
preventing companies from putting a risk premium on them.
Moreover, some export interest rates are also linked to the
bank rate. At the same time, prudential banking regulation
was strengthened.
14The stipulation is that loans up to Rs25,000 should carry
an interest rate of 12 percent per annum, and for loans
between Rs2,500 and Rs2 lakh, the rate should not exceed
13.5 percent per annum. About one third of total credit is
made up of loans of less than Rs200,000.
15While branching of foreign banks is still more directly
controlled, they are given a competitive advantage over
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domestic banks by a much lower priority sector lending
requirement of only 15 percent compared with the 40 per-
cent applicable to other banks.
16In the past, banks booked interest payments irrespec-
tive of whether they were actually paid, thus rendering
virtually all loans performing assets. Despite defaults, there
was also no motivation to write down their value on the
asset side of the balance sheet, cease booking interest on
the profit and loss account, and make adequate provi-
sions. Since bank performance was measured mainly in
terms of the quantity of loans extended, banks were not
reluctant to simply extend new loans when firms were get-
ting into difficulties. The definition of NPL is now 90 days
past due. If a loan is overdue more than six months, the
bank cannot take it to income account, as it is immediately
categorized as a substandard asset, with a requirement to
make a 10 percent provisioning. After 24 months, it is
classified as a doubtful asset. The secured portion re-
quires a 20–50 percent provisioning and the unsecured
portion a 100 percent provisioning. Concerning other pru-
dential requirements, margin loans are limited to a 50 per-
cent loan-valuation ratio.
17In order to determine the aggregate figures of NPLs in
the Indian banking system, some caution is required:
While NPLs are estimated using the Basle definition, the
official figures significantly understate the share of NPLs.
Only about half of bank credit is extended to the private
sector (50 percent is lent to the Government). Therefore,
the key ratio to consider is NPL out of total lending to
the nongovernment sector. That, however, is at least twice
as high as the official NPL ratios out of total loans, and
estimated at 17 percent by some analysts. There are six
categories of issues: Government (state or central) secu-
rities (carrying a zero risk weight), as well as shares, de-
bentures, corporate bonds, and CP (all of which carry a
100 percent risk weight). Private paper is mainly issued
by manufacturers. The CP market is regulated, with a
rating requirement.
18Additionally, in October 1992, RBI introduced a refi-
nance facility for banks and auction sale of securities with
a buy back clause. This provides the initial step for the
creation of a repo market, which would facilitate the imple-
mentation of independent monetary policy by RBI.
19In April 1992, the SLR on incremental deposits was re-
duced from 38.5 to 30 percent and the 10 percent CRR on
incremental deposits was eliminated. In October 1992, the
CRR was decreased and a target was set to cut the SLR to
25 percent by 1997. Moreover, in order to develop the call
money market, effective 26 April 1997, interbank liabilities
were exempted from the SLR.
20NBFIs accept deposits from the public and provide ser-
vices including loans, investments, equipment leasing,
hire purchase and housing finance. Between 1981 and
1990, total deposits held by NBFIs grew by 29 percent per
annum.
21The aim of this policy is to facilitate raising deposits.
Currently four credit rating agencies are in operation.
22However, for NBFIs, hire purchase and lease assets be-
come automatically nonperforming when they have been
overdue for 12 months.
23Up from 8 percent, and above the 8 percent for banks.
24The maximum interest ceiling is aimed at preventing
nonbanks from attracting deposits too aggressively and
creating moral hazard problems.
25This requirement was due to be raised to 15 percent in
April 1999.
26Also known as the 1998 Narasimhan Report as the Com-
mittee was chaired by Finance Minister M. Narasimhan.
27Claessens (1996) distinguishes two different approaches
to banking sector reform in transition-countries, namely,
the “new entry” approach and the “rehabilitation” ap-
proach. The difference in these two approaches lies in the
decision whether to allow a new or parallel private sector
banking system to emerge, or whether reform efforts
should rather focus on reform and rehabilitation of the
existing State-owned banking system. India has essen-
tially opted for a combination of both approaches. State-
owned banks were made to undergo significant reforms,
while new banks are also being allowed to emerge. Whether
India should be classified as a transition economy or sim-
ply a developing economy is a futile debate. What matters
is that it started out with a majority of banks being owned
by the Government and active Government intervention
in the banking system. Since India has adopted policies to
change this and increase the role of markets, it is in a
situation similar to that of many Eastern European coun-
tries after the Iron Curtain fell. In practice, most countries
have included aspects of both approaches.
28The problem of partial equilibrium analysis is that the
results are based on the ceteris paribus assumption. But
only mutatis mutandis analysis will be able to tell us about
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the overall net result of policies, including regulation
policy.
29They have acted as tool for fiscal policy due to the
substantial degree of monetization of fiscal spending, or,
in other words, compulsory credit extension by the bank-
ing system to the Government. They have served as a
tool of monetary policy, as ceilings have been set for
total credit creation, which in turn determines money
supply and hence economic growth. The credit alloca-
tion policies (directed credit) have been a key tool of
structural policies, including policies to support socially
weak strata.
30See, for instance, Vijai Joshi and I. M. D. Little, India’s
Economic Reforms 1991–2001, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1996, p. 111. However, in this world of imperfect informa-
tion, this should not come as a surprise. As Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) have shown, with imperfect information,
banks always ration credit, even in equilibrium. This
means that the credit market is supply-determined. The
policy implication is that governments can use the bank-
ing system as an efficient tool of economic policy. By
utilizing State rationing to ensure that new purchasing
power creation is only allocated to reasonably produc-
tive use (while undesirable sectors cannot obtain pur-
chasing power), industrial and structural policies can be
implemented simultaneously with monetary policy. This
has proven to be highly successful in the creation of the
“miracle economies” of Japan and other Asian econo-
mies.
31For instance, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have shown that
in the presence of asymmetric information, competitive
credit markets may not clear. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986)
have proven that with asymmetric information, the free
market equilibrium is not constrained Pareto efficient.
32See Vijay Joshi and I. M. D. Little (1996). While the
authors feel that “this is not an argument for interest rate
control in a ‘long run’ equilibrium but a sequencing argu-
ment about the order of liberalization,” they concede that
“the moral hazard/weak regulation argument for interest
rate ceilings is not devoid of relevance” for India (p. 128).
However, their argument that “liberalization is only dan-
gerous when conducted in an environment of weak regu-
lation and supervision of banks” is not supported by em-
pirical evidence from countries with strong regulation,
such as the UK and US, where banking crises were trig-
gered by deregulation. A primary reason is given in the
main text: the fallacy of composition when banks collater-
alize assets as they are competing for market share.
33Banks are weary of lending to the real estate sector be-
cause currently, tenancy laws are tough, eviction is diffi-
cult, and bankruptcy laws are not on par with international
standards. Banks generally find it hard to sell the security.
However, legal reform concerning the sector is currently
under consideration. As to the absolute share of real estate
loans, about 10 percent of total outstanding bank loans is to
NBFIs, which in many cases are lending the money on to the
real estate sector—a phenomenon witnessed in most coun-
tries with excessive credit expansion. Yet, in the Indian case,
the degree of such use of credit seems far more modest than
in Japan in the 1980s or East Asian countries in the 1990s.
34See, for instance, Joshi and Little (1996), op. cit., p. 147,
footnote 50.
35For details of the mechanism used by the Bank of Ja-
pan, see Werner (1998).
36Forder (1998) demonstrates that the literature that seems
to purport a correlation between central bank indepen-
dence and low inflation is not based on the empirical
record. See, for instance, Werner (1996, 1998) for evidence
on how a central bank, when left without checks and bal-
ances, can damage national welfare severely.
37For details, see the study on macroeconomic manage-
ment in Thailand that is part of this research project.
38Credit policy was announced in April and October—
the so-called slack season credit policy and the crop sea-
son credit policy.
39This is the potential real GDP growth rate. According to
RBI sources, the central bank currently estimates this at
7.5 percent, but realistically, in order to place the error
margin on the conservative side, uses 6.5 percent as a
working estimate.
40For instance, with 6.5 percent potential growth and 5
percent expected inflation, the money supply growth tar-
get would be 16 percent and the target for commercial
bank credit growth 19 percent (this figure excludes public
sector borrowing from banks).
41Three to four day, as well as 14 day repos (auction,
fixed rate).
42Report of the Working Group on Money Supply: Ana-
lytics and Methodology of Compilation. The TWG con-
sisted of six members. All key members (chairman, vice-
chairman and secretary) came from RBI.
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43“As a statistical concept, money could include certain
liquid liabilities of a particular set of financial intermediar-
ies or other issuers” (Chapter II).
44Concerning foreign liabilities, only foreign currency non-
resident (bank) (FCNR [B]) repatriable fixed deposits are
excluded from the domestic money stock.
45The TWG argues: “In India, as in many countries, the
broad money concept has been found to be operationally
useful, because of better correlation with aggregate eco-
nomic activity.” From among the four monetary aggre-
gates published by RBI, M1 and M3 are most popular
“both for policy purposes and in academic exercises.”
However, the inclusion of post office deposits as part of
the monetary aggregates “may not be in harmony with the
notion of ‘depository corporation’ since the postal de-
partment is a part of the general government.” This rea-
soning is accurate, because the post office is not a re-
serve-depositing client institution of the central bank and
hence does not have the power to create credit.
46It also argued in favor of publishing a quarterly finan-
cial sector survey that aggregates assets and liabilities of
financial corporations. The recommended aggregates are
as follows:
Monetary Aggregates:
• M0 (currency in circulation+bankers’ deposits with RBI
+ “other” deposits with RBI), weekly;
• M1 (currency with public+demand deposits with banks
+ “other” deposits with RBI), fortnightly;
• M2 (M1+savings deposits with banks+CDs issued by
banks+term deposits up to one year with banks), fort-
nightly; and
• M3 (M2+term deposits over a year+call/term borrow-
ings from “nondepository” financial corporations by the
banking system), fortnightly.
Liquidity Aggregates:
• L1 (M3+post office deposits), monthly;
• L2 (L1+term deposits and CDs issued by financing insti-
tutions), monthly; and
• L3 (L2+ public deposits of NBFIs), quarterly.
47The report makes the point that while bank credit to
the Government is clearly identified, bank credit to the
commercial sector is only defined by loans, cash credit,
overdrafts, bills purchased, bills discounted, and invest-
ments in approved securities other than government se-
curities. Bank investment in CP, shares, and debentures
issued by the commercial sector are not included in the
credit aggregates.
48A problem with the credit statistics is that no IMF-style
monetary survey has been constructed that measures the
flow from the entire financial system to the Government
and the commercial sector. Concerning the question of
how to handle the increasing volume of credit card use,
the Group concludes that their inclusion in monetary ag-
gregates is not necessary, since they “merely provide more
convenient and efficient means of transferring demand
deposits.” However, considering the credit aggregate ap-
proach, they should be included, as they mobilize depos-
its and thus turn potential purchasing power into effec-
tive purchasing power.
49“The tests for predictive stability showed that there
has been a unidirectional short-term deviation from the
long-run equilibrium path that needs to be captured in
terms of other relevant variables to ensure predictive ac-
curacy.” The TWG suggests further research on the sta-
bility of an error correction model in place of the original
structural equation. That, however, has been prevented
by the lack of degrees of freedom due to lack of data (only
short, annual time series on GDP are available) in order to
be able to formulate a robust error correction model (ECM).
50A study cited by the TWG concerning the evidence
for causality (using Granger causality tests) yielded bi-
directional causality. The TWG claims that an “examina-
tion of transmission channels for the period April 1993
to March 1997 found output response to expansionary
monetary policy operating through interest rates to be
stronger and more persistent than that of the credit chan-
nel.” However, the details of this finding and its basis
are not mentioned.
51See also Thon (1998). Bryan and Cecchetti (1993) use
the consumer price index excluding food and energy to
measure core inflation. Their main finding was that while
using the mean of the consumer price index, the relation-
ship with the past money growth is strong. Given an RBI
statement that these methods are devised specifically to
have a strong relationship with the money growth and
thus could be conclusion-induced, it becomes obvious
that RBI also officially follows the opinion that inflation
is mainly caused by a rise in the money supply. Money
supply in that context is given by the money aggregate
M3.
52The quantity theory of money is expressed as MV=PT,
where M is the quantity of money, most often expressed
as M3, V the velocity of circulation, P the price index, and
T the volume of transactions. Thus M and P must vary in
proportion.
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53Werner (1997) tested his model in the case of Japan. He
explained three anomalies: first, the velocity decline; sec-
ond, the price bubbles; and third, Japanese capital out-
flows. He introduces a model of disaggregated credit. This
study has to content itself with annual data from RBI. The
best proxy to explain inflation in India was found to be
“credit to the commercial sector.”
54All NBFIs must register at RBI. NBFIs must also con-
form to liquid asset ratios set by RBI, as well as transfer
compulsory reserve funds. Moreover, RBI can also regu-
late the deployment of funds and credit policy of NBFIs.
55The system of ad-hoc Treasury bills as a means of fi-
nancing the budget deficit was discontinued effective from
1 April 1997. It has been replaced by a system of “ways
and means advances” (WMA). Under the new arrange-
ment, the Government decides at the beginning of the
year how much of an overdraft facility it will obtain from
the RBI. When the overdraft exceeds the target by more
than 10 days, the Government is obliged to convert the
shortfall into Government bills (90-day Treasury bills),
which are then auctioned in the open market. Only if pri-
vate sector investors do not pick up the issue, can the
Government, with the agreement of the RBI, instruct the
RBI to monetize the remainder. If the private sector buys
the issue, the RBI is not obliged to act as a buyer. After
the year 2000, the RBI does not have to buy any under
any circumstances, as it will be totally independent. The
temporary accommodation by way of WMA for meeting
temporary mismatches between expenditure and receipts
will be outside the Reserve Bank’s support to the
Government’s borrowing program during the year. The
size and cost of WMA would be determined on the basis
of mutual agreement between the Reserve Bank and the
Government. Amounts drawn beyond the WMA limit
would be treated as an overdraft. The limit of the WMA
for the first six months (April–September) of the fiscal
year 1997/98 was fixed at Rs12,000 crore and for the sub-
sequent six months (October–March) of the year at Rs8,000
crore. This change of funding means that the definition of
the budget deficit changes. Conventionally, it comprised
changes in ad-hoc Treasury bills net of changes in cash
balances. This has now been rendered redundant. There-
fore, the key measure of the deficit is now in terms of
gross figures. On the other hand, the monetized deficit,
which mainly captures changes in the RBI’s holding of
dated securities and auctioned treasury bills, will reflect
the monetary impact of the Government’s fiscal opera-
tions. Although the budget has estimated a monetized
deficit of Rs.16,000 crore during 1997/98, representing the
ex-ante level of Reserve Bank’s support to central Gov-
ernment market borrowings, the actual out-turn at the close
of the year could be different, depending on the indepen-
dent decisions of the RBI concerning its open market op-
erations during the course of the year. For details, see the
Economic Survey 1997–1998, Government of India. In this
document, the reason for the change to the WMA system
is explained as follows: “The WMA is intended to
strengthen fiscal discipline, while providing greater au-
tonomy to the RBI in its conduct of monetary policy. This
would make monetary impact of fiscal operations trans-
parent and facilitate the process of fiscal consolidation. A
clear-cut WMA limit during the course of the year would
put a cap on the automatic monetization of the fiscal defi-
cit and create conducive macro economic environment for
setting a “monetary target”. Besides, dismantling of ad-
hoc treasury bills also entails a shift in the composition of
financing of fiscal deficit toward market borrowing. How-
ever, from the operational point of view, the new arrange-
ment of WMA would necessitate improvement in cash
management by the central Government as well as debt
management by the Reserve banks, so as to keep the cash
deficit within the limits of WMA for the year” (p. 21).
56Paper of various maturities: 14, 28, 91, and 364 days. A
182-day bill is being introduced.
57On Japan, see Werner (1996 and 1998).
58The Economist, 6–12 June 1998 issue.
59FDI increased by $400 million to reach $4.4 billion in
1996/97. However, flows remained a fraction of FDI ap-
provals, which exceeded $20 billion in the past two years.
FDI inflows are still only around 0.75 percent of GDP, small
compared to countries such as the People’s Republic of
China, Indonesia, or Malaysia, which attracted FDI in-
flows of some 3–4 percent of GDP in 1996.
60The only areas controlled by the Government in terms
of FDI are in the advertisement and TV sectors, as well as
conferences held in India.
61Foreign currency nonresident bank scheme: Since 15
August 1993, banks were allowed to accept foreign cur-
rency deposits for a minimum period of six months (up to
three years). The conditions were that bank positions must
be hedged, an interest ceiling is set related to London
interbank offered rate (LIBOR). However, with a volume of
about $1 billion per year (less than 5 percent of bank li-
abilities), such activity is still of minor significance.
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62FIIs fall under the jurisdiction of Securities and Exchange
Board of India (SEBI), which so far has registered more
than 300.
63Foreign borrowing is not subject to minimum ratios. Lend-
ing in foreign currency is only allowed for productive ac-
tivities (capital expenditures, working capital). Foreign port-
folio investment by Indian residents is not allowed.
64Based on interviews at RBI. Exact figures are not pub-
lished.
65A simple limit is set. This means that regulators do not
have to prove the illegality of individual transactions. If
an agent holds too much, a foreign exchange law violation
has been demonstrated.
66During this period the spot exchange rate moved in the
tight range of Rs35.50–36/$. Six-month forward premiums
remained in the range of 6 to 9 percent during 1996/97 and
narrowed further in 1997/98 to 3 to 6 percent.
67This was done by net purchases of dollars amounting
to $7.8 billion, which were added to the foreign exchange
reserves of RBI.
68There is another $6 billion–$8 billion in trade credit.
Remittances (e.g., from Indians in the Gulf) to nonresident
deposits amount to $9 billion.
69The Committee was given the following terms of refer-
ence:
• to review international experience in relation to capital
account convertibility;
• to recommend measures for achieving capital account
convertibility;
• to specify the timing and time frame for such measures;
and
• to suggest domestic policy measures and changes in
institutional framework.
70When the Committee is talking about “more liberal lim-
its with regard to borrowings from abroad,” the increased
liberalization refers to direct Government intervention,
which will at least partly be shifted to the central bank.
71The key reforms suggested by the Committee regarding
the liberalization of capital flows over the three-year-pe-
riod are as follows:
• Indian joint ventures of wholly owned subsidiaries
should be allowed to invest up to $50 million in ventures
abroad at the level of the authorized dealers in Phase 1.
This should be subject to transparent and comprehen-
sive guidelines set out by RBI;
• exporters and other exchange earners may be permitted
100 percent retention of earnings in Exchange Earners
Foreign Currency accounts with complete flexibility in
operation of these accounts including check writing fa-
cility in Phase 1;
• individual residents may be allowed to invest in assets
and financial markets abroad up to $25,000 in Phase 1,
increasing to $50,000 in Phase 2 and $100,000 in Phase 3;
• banks may be given more liberal limits with regard to
borrowings from abroad and deployment of funds out-
side India. Borrowings (short and long term) may be sub-
ject to an overall limit of 50 percent of unimpaired tier-1
capital in Phase 1. The borrowings should have a sub-
limit for short-term borrowings;
• foreign direct and portfolio investment and disinvest-
ment should be governed by comprehensive and trans-
parent guidelines, and prior reserve bank approval at
various stages may be dispensed with subject to report-
ing by authorized dealers (ADs); and
• all Indian financial institutions fulfilling requisite criteria
should be allowed to become full-fledged ADs.
The above recommendations contribute to a liberaliza-
tion of Indian capital flows and strengthen the position
of the central bank. While setting a more liberalized frame-
work, RBI will get more influence over the economy, be-
cause of its central position in the process of liberaliza-
tion of capital flows. Even though prior reserve bank
approval may be dispensed with regard to foreign direct
and portfolio investment, the control mechanism is only
shifted to a second tier. By controlling ADs, not much
would change in the control system. The withdrawal from
the primary market in Government securities would give
RBI a further degree of freedom in managing monetary
policy independently, as the central bank could then de-
cide how much of the Government deficit should be mon-
etized. The Government on the other side would lose a
degree of freedom to manage the economy independently.
Regarding that problem, the discussion should center
on the question of whether or not a central bank should
be independent.
72This followed recommendations of the Expert Group on
Foreign Exchange Market, chaired by Shri O. P. Sodhani.
73Also, since April 1996, the aggregate gap limit, which
before could not exceed $100 million or six times the net
owned funds of a bank, has been left to be determined by
the individual banks, subject to RBI approval.
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74Either by booking the transactions overseas or on a
back-to-back basis. Up-front premiums or other charges
deriving from hedge transactions can be implemented with-
out prior approval of RBI.
75Such as range forwards and ratio range forwards. These
are subject to the condition that there is no net inflow of
premiums to the customers.
76This limit has been modified to include overnight invest-
ments out of nostro account balances of the banks. Finally,
according to RBI, ADs have also been permitted to book
forward cover for exporters and importers on the basis of a
declaration of exposures supported by past performance
and business projection provided the total forward con-
tracts outstanding did not exceed the average export/im-
port turnover of the last two years. This measure was tem-
porarily withdrawn when foreign exchange volatility soared
in mid to late 1997. Presently, forward cover is allowed only
on the basis of documents that prove exposure.
77This is an ongoing program. On 23 April 1998, RBI is-
sued a binding ordinance that all but two states have to
establish an independent regulatory authority that will
review the tariff structure and eventually pass tariff re-
form. For quantitative details of India’s tariff rate, see
Appendix 3.
78Inefficient State enterprises remain as privatization has
been limited. A Board for Industrial and Financial Recon-
struction (BIFR) was established in 1987, but it could have
been more active in resolving the problems of ailing public
sector enterprises. Much of the protective framework of
India’s previous import substitution policy remains in place.
Most of the labor legislation was left intact. The politically
sensitive “exit policy,” both with regard to closures of plants
and forced reductions in labor forces, has not been ad-
dressed. Liberalization and deregulation in the domestic
economy (e.g., abolition of licensing) has proceeded fur-
ther than that in India’s links with the global economy (where
many controls over trade and capital remain in place).
79Developing countries refer to 93 countries with popula-
tion of more than one million. Trade is the simple sum of
exports and imports of goods and nonfactor services on a
national accounts basis. (See Brahmbhatt, Srinivasan, and
Murrell [1997]).
80See Dean, Desai, and Riedel (1994).
81Investment was substantial in engineering, chemical, and
food and dairy products. The dominant source of the re-
cent inflows has been Mauritius, followed by US, Germany,
Netherlands, Singapore and Korea. A possible explanation
for the dominant role of Mauritius is the double taxation
treaty between the two countries, which favors the routing
of overseas foreign investment flows through Mauritius.
This, therefore, may give a misleading picture, as the ulti-
mate source country may be different.
82See, for instance, Brahmbhatt, Srinivasan, and Murrell
(1997). It is, however, not clear that credit ratings are actu-
ally a good indicator of globalization. They are likely to
prove more reliable as indicator of potential opening and
globalization.
83Countries with the highest ratings usually can borrow
at rates of up to 50 basis points (bp) above benchmark US
rates, while those with poor ratings face stiff premia of 500
bp or more over the benchmark—or cannot borrow abroad
at all. For properties of the ratings and their relationship
with economic performance, see, among others, Haque et.
al. (1996).
84See, for instance, Sachs and Warner (1995).
85See Brahmbhatt, Srinivasan, and Murrell (1997).
86The standardized score is the variable less its mean
divided by its standard deviation.
87Sachs and Warner (1995) searched for the reasons why
East Asian countries chose more open, market-oriented
strategies, while most of the rest of the developing coun-
tries, including India, did not. Their best answer lies in
national security. Most Southeast Asian countries looked
to the UK and the US for military defense and internal
security. The US in particular, through foreign aid and
technical assistance, helped to nudge Korea; Taipei,China;
and Thailand into a relatively open trading regime.
88See, for instance, Brahmbhatt, Srinivasan, and Murrell
(1997).
89For details of India’s historic development record, see,
for instance, Ray (1979).
90See Jalan (1998) for a detailed review of the develop-
ments in 1997/98.
91Options for rationalizing its transfers could include
(i) doing away with the fixed (70 percent for major states)
loan component of central assistance to state plans, and
replacing this with specific purpose loans advanced on the
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basis of repayment capacity, with generous provision of
technical assistance, particularly for states with weak ca-
pacity and (ii) replacing the current system of resources thinly
spread across many central schemes with a much smaller
set of well targeted redistributive transfers focused on the
needy states and monitored by the Planning Commission.
92The fiscal deficit has been roughly constant in the re-
gion of 3–4 percent of GDP. Most of the small revenue
increase has come from increased tax devolution and grants
from the center. Total expenditure has increased mainly
due to interest payments outweighing a small decrease in
expenditure on social and economic services.
93The 10th Finance Commission recommended in 1994 a
change in the devolution, and a change from individual
income tax and excise duty that could be used by the states,
to a system where there is a broad overall budget and the
states obtain a fixed part of the revenue—a recommended
29 percent of the central Government’s total tax revenues,
instead of relying on its decisions about tax rates. As a
result, revenues for the states have slightly increased.
94According to RBI statements, the “objectives of mon-
etary policy in India have evolved as those of maintaining
price stability and ensuring adequate flow of credit to the
productive sectors of the economy.” However, RBI admit-
ted, though “both output expansion and price stability
are important objectives, (...) depending on specific cir-
cumstances of the year, emphasis is placed on either of
the two. Increasingly, it is being recognized that central
banks would have to target price stability since real growth
itself would be in jeopardy if inflation rates go beyond the
margin of tolerance.”
95The poverty alleviation strategy of the Government can
be described as follows: (i) increasing the productive em-
ployment opportunities in the process of growth itself,
and (ii) human resource development comprising better
health and nutrition. With 80 percent of India’s poor resid-
ing in rural areas, any program for poverty alleviation must
be tied to the performance of agriculture. Agricultural sec-
tor annual growth has been estimated at 3.5 percent since
1991/92 creating an average of six million jobs a year. In
addition, state spending on social programs has been
maintained at 5.3 percent of GDP since 1991/92. The 1995/
96 budget introduced antipoverty programs that required
commercial banks to provide credit to small units, sched-
uled castes and tribes, enterprises in backward regions,
and state governments to complete ongoing rural infra-
structure projects. In 1996, the Government revised its
methodology of measuring poverty by introducing a pov-
erty definition relative to a consumption level equivalent
to a daily food intake of 2,100–2,400 calories. According
to the measure, 36 percent of the population lived below
the official poverty line in 1993/94, which was twice as
much as the number calculated by the previous methodol-
ogy. The new methodology implied a decline of 2.9 per-
centage points in the poverty rate since 1987/88, the date
of the last official estimate. Over the same period, the real
wage of unskilled agricultural labor—an alternative pov-
erty indicator—has increased by 1 percent; however, af-
ter recovering strongly from a trough in 1991/92, the agri-
cultural wage declined in 1994/95 and 1995/96.
96This has led to widespread power theft and misuse,
which result in frequent brownouts and blackouts even in
New Delhi. In total, more than 50 percent of electricity is
supplied for free, while industries are overcharged.
97In a recent survey conducted by the Confederation of
Indian Industry, participants regarded infrastructure con-
straints as a major bottleneck to growth, with one third of all
responding companies being affected by power constraints.
98Export profitability would improve (while domestic prof-
itability would go down, because of the higher cost of
sale of goods in the domestic market) while administrative
licensing of imports would decrease, since allocation func-
tion is transferred to the market. The import cost of raw
material and components would go up, which would re-
duce the rate of protection of final products (high at the
moment), and the rate of protection for components would
rise (low at the moment).
99This is the last year for which GDP is available at cur-
rent prices.
100The total debt disbursed and outstanding may not be
a good measure for inter-country comparisons, as some
debt may be at low interest rates. Thus the World Bank
uses present value (PV) based classifications. India’s debt
has a high component of concessional debt, which has a
lower PV than borrowings on market terms. According to
the World Bank, India’s PV of debt stood at only $70.61 at
the end of 1996/97. This would put India as No. 9 in terms
of indebtedness among developing countries.
101Similarly, the ratio of PV of debt to GNP is lower, at 22
percent in 1996/97, putting India further ahead in the inter-
national comparison.
102World Bank (1998). The corresponding figures (in per-
cent) for other countries in 1996 were as follows:
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